Confronting the COVID-19 pandemic: grief, loss, and social order by Millar, Katharine M. et al.
Confronting the 
COVID-19 
Pandemic  
Grief, Loss, and Social Order  
Department of International Relations 
 
 
 
Dr Katharine M Millar, Dr Yuna Han, Dr Martin Bayly, 
Katharina Kuhn, and Irene Morlino 
 
2          Confronting the COVID-19 Pandemic 
 
Authors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Funding  
 
  
Dr Katharine M Millar, Assistant Professor  
Department of International Relations  
London School of Economics 
Contact: K.M.Millar@lse.ac.uk 
 
Dr Yuna Han, Fellow 
Department of International Relations  
London School of Economics 
Contact: Y.C.Han@lse.ac.uk 
 
Dr Martin Bayly, Assistant Professor 
Department of International Relations  
London School of Economics 
Contact: M.J.Bayly@lse.ac.uk 
 
Katharina Kuhn, Doctoral Student 
Department of International Relations  
London School of Economics 
Contact: K.Kuhn@lse.ac.uk 
 
Irene Morlino, Doctoral Student 
Department of International Relations  
London School of Economics 
Contact: I.Morlino@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
Research Assistants: 
The authors acknowledge and gratefully thank Anaïs Fiault, Zoe Knight, and Lily Yu for 
their invaluable research assistance on this project. The authors also gratefully thank 
Meg Millar for her copyediting assistance.  
 
 
This study was generously supported by a grant from the London School of 
Economics’ COVID-19 Pilot Research Fund. 
 
Confronting the COVID-19 Pandemic          3  
Table of Contents  
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ 4 
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................................... 4 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 5 
1.1 Context: Literature Review ........................................................................................................... 5 
1.2 Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 8 
UK: 1918-1919 INFLUENZA PANDEMIC ..................................................................................... 12 
UNITED KINGDOM ..................................................................................................................... 16 
ITALY ........................................................................................................................................ 27 
SOUTH KOREA .......................................................................................................................... 36 
GERMANY ................................................................................................................................. 44 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................... 55 
Crisis Narrative ................................................................................................................................. 55 
Death Management .......................................................................................................................... 56 
Commemoration and Memorialisation ........................................................................................... 56 
APPENDIX: POLICY BRIEFS ....................................................................................................... 60 
Communicating the Pandemic ........................................................................................................ 60 
The Challenge and Necessity of Commemorating COVID-19 ....................................................... 62 
 
 
4          Confronting the COVID-19 Pandemic  
Executive Summary  
This research addresses the challenge the 2019-
2020 COVID-19 pandemic (COVID-19) presents to 
social order as a result of mass grieving and loss. 
It places a particular emphasis on the UK 
response and lessons that can be learnt for 
further ‘waves’. A tendency for research to look at 
technocratic policy responses has led to the 
overlooking of the social impact that pandemics 
produce. This study, in contrast, employs a 
qualitative, comparative methodology to examine 
four key cases – the UK, Italy, South Korea, and 
Germany – from 1 January to 31 July 2020, as 
well as the UK during the 1918-19 influenza 
epidemic – to examine the politics of COVID-9 as 
a mass death event. 
 
Our research finds that the narrative framing of 
the pandemic as a particular type of crisis; the 
ways that deaths have been recorded and 
managed; and the manner in which loss has been 
mourned and commemorated vary across cases. 
This variance, the research suggests, has 
implications for the ways that societies may 
respond, particularly in the medium- and long-
term. Recommendations are made for 
governments responding to future ‘waves’ of the 
virus in relation to communicating loss to the 
public, and commemorating deaths in a manner 
that supports social cohesion and prepares the 
public for future crises. 
 
Key Recommendations 
Based on this research, the report makes the 
following top-line recommendations. Though 
largely aimed at government, the general principles 
may be applied to many local institutions and civil 
society organisations. For further explication, 
recommendations, and context, please refer to the 
Appendices. 
 
§ Provide a clear separation between 
different types of communication: factual, 
political, and emotional 
§ Address grief experienced by the public 
explicitly, empathetically, and consistently 
in emotive terms 
§ Emphasize that the deaths of elderly 
people and/or people with underlying 
conditions are not inevitable 
§ Acknowledge differential patterns of death 
and grief/loss experienced by different 
communities in official communications) 
§ Designate a national day of mourning, 
marked by a day off work and programming 
at national and local levels by religious and 
government officials and community 
members 
§ Commission a nationally funded, locally- 
embedded four-nations collective history 
project to collect remembrances of the 
deceased and experiences of loss in 
communities  
§ Establish a fund to support 
commemoration and memorialisation to 
which local/regional/national groups and 
communities may apply to support projects 
and activities  
§ Develop a set of best practices to ensure 
diversity, inclusivity, accessibility, and 
representation in commissioning and 
implementing commemorative practices, 
events and monuments  
§ Differentiate clearly between 
commemoration (recognition of an 
important event/ social contribution) and 
memorialisation (honouring of the 
deceased) in public recognition of health, 
care, and key workers 
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Introduction  
Pandemics present a distinct challenge to social 
order. The sheer scale of the loss of life, and its 
differential impact upon particular communities 
threatens social cohesion, and challenges national 
and local government agencies. Whilst public 
health management is naturally the dominant 
policy response, the social impact of the COVID-19 
response is potentially overlooked. 
 
This interdisciplinary research project draws upon 
a cross-country comparison to assess the way that 
societies have responded to mass death in light of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. We use a qualitative, 
comparative methodology to examine four key 
cases – the UK, Italy, South Korea, and Germany – 
from 1 January to  31 July 2020, as well as the UK 
during the 1918-19 influenza epidemic – and their 
responses to mass pandemic death. An array of 
literature, including work on post-conflict 
transitional justice, the politics of military deaths, 
and memorialisation studies shows that grief, loss, 
and remembrance – even when conducted in 
private – are deeply political processes that shape 
a new normal. Elites have a role to play in this 
process, in terms of how they narrate the particular 
crisis; how they relate to the impact of grief, loss, 
and death; and how they respond to its differential 
effects. A reluctance to talk about death, 
particularly in the UK context,1 makes this research 
particularly important. 
 
Mass death therefore has social effects. The 
experience of grief, loss, and death also has a ‘long 
tail’. Memorialisation and collective memory 
become important not just to address the impact 
of mass death on social cohesion, but to allow 
societies to build resilience in the instance of later 
pandemic ‘waves’ or different pandemic strains in 
the future.  
1.1 Context: Literature Review 
We approach the politics and social impact of 
COVID-19 fatalities through the lens of 
international relations, sociology, conflict, and 
nationalism scholarship. Studies of war, post-
conflict reconciliation, and the politics of collective 
memory offer important insights into the tense 
relationship between governing narratives of death 
and crisis and subsequent prospects for social 
order, cohesion, and the resumption of ‘normal’ 
politics. 
 
Our analytical framework (see subsequent section) 
is drawn from the factors this literature indicates 
are important to the production of social order 
following mass death. Given the continually 
evolving and therefore currently unknown medium- 
and long-term effects of mass COVID-19 death, 
this literature also informs our forward-looking 
analysis and recommendations. Historical 
literature regarding past pandemics is integrated 
where relevant – most centrally in the historical 
analysis of the 1918-19 UK influenza epidemic. 
 
Importantly, we understand ‘social order’ in the 
broadest sense. It is not simply an absence 
dissent, unrest, and/or crime, but the social 
structures, relations, and community and cultural 
resources that enable a society to function 
socially, politically, and economically. Importantly, 
as social order often refers to notions of stability 
and consensus, this does not mean order per se is 
normatively valuable – unjust and violent orders 
exist – but that it is socially and politically 
important. Given the quick-moving nature of the 
pandemic – bluntly, we do not yet know what will 
happen – and the rapid timeframe for this 
particular report, we do not precisely 
disaggregate/measure social order. This is an 
important avenue for future research. Instead, our 
6          Confronting the COVID-19 Pandemic  
analysis regarding social order is based on the 
informed interpretation of the relevance of the 
literature below for both COVID-19 generally and 
our cases specifically. 
 
Death and Social Order 
The sociological and anthropological literature 
finds that death poses a potential threat to social 
order.2 Most societies have developed grieving 
practices that enable loss to be processed and, 
eventually, ‘normal’ life resumed.3 State institutions 
and elites play a significant role in managing both 
the material aspects of death and collective 
processes of grief and mourning.4  
 
How deaths are addressed, or not addressed, by 
elites can have unintended consequences in 
enabling or constraining future policy choices by 
entrenching dominant policies, marginalising 
alternatives, and making some policy changes 
difficult by establishing taboos in public 
discourse.5 Nationalism and military scholarship 
demonstrates that ‘good deaths’ – such as those 
of volunteer soldiers in a legitimate conflict –  are 
socially interpreted as understandable, tragic but 
acceptable, and recognised in a precise, 
meaningful time and place.6  These deaths follow 
recognisable social scripts. They can be forged 
into affirming narratives that produce positive 
visions of national identity, increase social 
solidarity, and promote belonging.7 They also, 
importantly, normalise the risk of death as a key 
characteristic of the job of military personnel. 
 
‘Bad deaths’, in contrast, which are not easily 
placed into existing narratives8 – such as sudden 
deaths, enforced disappearances, or mass 
catastrophe – reveal the limitations upon state 
institutions and elites’ ability to provide security.9 
They have the potential to undermine public trust 
in institutions, feelings of political membership, 
and social cohesion. 
 
Mass Death and Post-Conflict Reconciliation 
Studies of mass violence, civil war, and post-
conflict justice and reconciliation demonstrate that 
clashing imperatives between the state and local 
communities – as well as groups within society – 
in addressing mass death may exacerbate social 
cleavages (and produce new ones). Bluntly, the 
sudden appearance of many dead bodies is not 
only a logistical problem of material storage and 
mortuary practices, but also a political problem. 10 
In conflict situations, the state’s desire to rapidly 
retrieve bodies to preserve evidence and/or 
prevent a public health emergency can clash with 
the desire of victims to conduct funeral rites and 
respect the dignity of those who died.11 The 
disruption of burial and religious rites can project 
trauma and social division and friction long after 
the cessation of the initial conflict/crisis.12  
 
Societal understandings of mass death are 
multidirectional, as narratives of loss, cause and 
effect, and blame are produced by national, 
regional, and local governments – as well as 
communities – simultaneously. This suggests that 
seemingly technocratic responses to mass death, 
such as hygiene regulations or the means of 
communicating fatalities, have important affective, 
social, and political consequences.13   
 
Existing research on security and conflict 
policymaking has demonstrated how a crisis is 
narrated—as an identifiable story outlining what the 
challenge is and who the players are —can play a 
critical role in constructing political behaviour. 
Crisis narratives can mobilise political action, 
promote certain collective values, and encourage 
solidarity among the public.14 Conversely, too 
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much distance between the lived reality of much of 
the public, who are grieving the loss of their loved 
ones, and the government’s account of the crisis 
(or normalisation efforts), which makes such loss 
less visible or even an acceptable form of sacrifice, 
can lead to increased public discontent.15   
 
The question of responsibility for mass death – in 
terms of direct harm, neglect, mismanagement, 
and failures of recognition –  can exacerbate 
racism and other societal divisions.16 Elite 
messaging regarding victims and their identities – 
as well as a failure to discuss or acknowledge all 
victims and their identities – can produce implicit 
hierarchies in grief (and social valuations of 
particular lives).17 Similar contestations can occur 
when groups and communities produce claims to 
visibility, victimhood, and/or blame. These operate 
as political claims to recognition, power, and a 
stake in community identity, which may be 
positive,18 but can also exacerbate societal 
divisions and racism.19 Research suggests 
exclusive narratives of victimhood are associated 
with negative attitudes towards members of other 
groups, whereas inclusive narratives of 
conflict/atrocity experience and victimhood are 
associated with positive relationships between 
groups and increased prospects for social 
solidarity.20 
 
Commemoration and Collective Memory 
The experience of mass death, and seemingly 
short-term social and political choices regarding 
grief and commemoration have long-term 
effects.21 The state has an important – though not 
singular – role in the formation of collective 
memory through commemoration, 
memorialisation, and other public memory-making 
practices.22 Commemoration and collective 
memory carry the social, political, and affective 
experience of mass death into the future.23 
Decisions about what and who are commemorated 
— Including the decision to not commemorate at 
all24 —  strongly inform popular memory of crises. 
As a result, commemoration is a foundation for 
future policy making and societal recovery.25   
 
Commemoration, importantly, is not 
straightforwardly positive or negative.26 Memory ‘is 
a struggle over power and who gets to decide the 
future’.27 Top-down commemorative practices that 
further a singular, elite-driven narrative of the crisis 
often prioritise a quick return to a narrow, physical 
security-based understanding of ‘normality’ – and 
the preservation of a particular government’s 
political power – over inclusive and locally-
sensitive memorialisation.28 Narrow and 
unresponsive commemorative practices can, 
again, further social cleavages and divisions by 
providing an account of the crisis that does not 
align with popular experience. It also, again, 
indicates, which deaths – and thus people and 
communities – were seen as important losses to 
the society (and those that were not).29 The Black 
Lives Matter movement, for instance, has revealed 
the way past commemoration choices (e.g. 
colonial statues) contribute to a limited 
understanding of history and the persistence of 
racism and inequality in the present. 
 
Commemoration is not a guarantee of ‘lessons 
learned’ or the prevention of future crises and 
atrocities.30 Neither, however, does an absence of 
explicit commemoration necessarily support 
recovery and resilience. Historians observe that 
the so-called ‘Spanish flu’ epidemic of 1918-19 
went largely un-commemorated, partially due to 
the fact that many of the victims were young, 
working class and/or marginalised people lacking 
in political power and social visibility.31 They argue 
that the failure to commemorate the 1918-19 
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pandemic resulted in a collective ‘forgetting’ that 
undermined future preparedness and public health 
measures.32  
 
Research indicates that reflective, consultative, 
and locally embedded commemoration can 
strengthen social cohesion, through the production 
of inclusive collective memory. The involvement of 
victims and survivors’ organisations,33  bottom-up 
community campaigns,34 and the pairing of ad hoc 
and local commemoration with more official state 
practice has supported these efforts. 
Commemoration that enables people to engage 
with loss, and offer many perspectives on the 
crisis, rather than enforcing a single narrative, has 
been observed to promote social solidarity.35  
 
Key Takeaway 
The scale and abruptness of COVID-19 deaths, 
unprecedented nature of the pandemic, and well-
documented disruptions to both private and public 
mourning rituals give COVID-19 fatalities an 
ambiguous social meaning. The literature 
suggests that, unrecognised and mismanaged, 
COVID-19 fatalities may pose a threat to social 
order and cohesion, while inclusive, locally 
embedded reckoning with loss and grief 
contributes to solidarity and recovery. 
1.2 Methodology 
The research consists of a cross-national survey of 
the impact of COVID-19 in four contemporary 
cases: the UK, Italy, Germany, and South Korea, 
from 1 January to 31 July 2020. Primary source 
materials included government communications at 
the local, national and ministry level as well as 
press reporting at the national level. In addition, 
one historical case study of the impact of the 
1918-1920 Spanish flu pandemic on the UK, 
provides historical context. At the time this project 
began, the scale of death in the UK was unknown. 
The contemporary cases were therefore selected 
to capture variance in death rate (with South Korea 
having a low death rate, Italy high, and Germany in 
the middle), with the aim of drawing lessons both 
broadly and for the UK. Since then, a wide disparity 
has opened up with Italy and the UK exhibiting 
higher death rates than Germany and South Korea. 
As the analysis will demonstrate, however, while 
this variance certainly informs the management 
and narratives around death in each case, the 
scale of death is not deterministic in its social 
interpretation or effects. 
 
Whilst there may be good reasons to infer that 
institutional differences between governments 
shape pandemic responses, this study is not 
concerned with this, nor indeed with explaining the 
relative success or failure of different policy 
responses. Instead, the study focusses on the 
discourses surrounding the way that the pandemic 
has been narrated, how loses have been reported, 
how grief has been discussed, and how 
memorialisation has been carried out. We use an 
interpretive methodology, seeking to understand 
what conditions of possibility might be created by 
different ways of dealing with death and 
memorialisation. 
 
Three core research thematics shaped the 
interpretation of the primary source material with 
sub-themes emerging within them (see figure 1.).  
 
‘Crisis narrative’ concerns the way that the 
pandemic is narrated by elites. A prominent 
subtheme here was the discourse of the pandemic 
as a ‘war’, and the question of blame/responsibility 
which singles out certain sectors of society for 
privileged treatment and/or culpability. This theme 
is also concerned with the ways in which certain 
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levels or patterns of death are produced as socially 
‘normal’ (or inevitable/acceptable).  
 
‘Death management’ relates to the way that bodies 
of the deceased were recorded and processed, and 
how funeral practices were regulated. It maps the 
ways in which deaths were recorded and 
communicated. It also examines the social and 
political implications of disrupted practices of grief 
and mourning, such as hospital visitation and 
funerals. A key sub-theme is the ways in which 
death management regulations and administration 
had differential effects upon particular 
communities. 
 
‘Mourning and commemoration’ concerns the way 
that a society remembers. Literature on 
memorialisation and post-conflict transitions 
shows society has a stake in the way in which it 
‘remembers’. Commemoration has long-term 
social effects. Particularly important here are the 
‘hierarchies of grief’ that opened up between 
certain groups. 
 
In practice, these thematic pillars are related and 
intertwined. The crisis narrative (for instance) is 
both informed by and informs death management; 
mourning and commemoration are informed by 
demographics of loss and the hierarchies of grief 
they foster, and so forth. These relationalities are 
explored in the case studies outlined below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1: Core research thematics and sub-themes 
Crisis Narrative
War vs. non-war 
framing
Death rate vs. 
recovery/infection 
rates
Discourses of 
responsibility/ 
blame
Death 
Management
Recording of loss
Demographics of 
loss
Funeral practices
Mourning and 
Commemoration
Official/ad-hoc
Hierarchies of 
grief/loss
Sites of 
memorialisation
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UK: 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic 
Martin Bayly  
 
In a period of 46 weeks between 1918-1919 the 
‘Spanish Flu’36 pandemic killed an estimated 
228,000 in the UK, making 1918 the first year on 
record in which deaths exceeded births.37 In the 
US, an estimated death toll of 675,000 reduced the 
national life expectancy by 12 years. Elsewhere, 
the mortality rate was staggering. In South Africa, 
the relatively small population suffered a toll of 
140,000 dead - mostly non-Europeans. Cape Town, 
it was said, was a ‘city of the dead’, with the Press 
Association reporting that some ‘native’ 
communities had been entirely wiped out.38 India 
suffered the worst toll, compounded by an ongoing 
famine, with estimates reaching as high as 18.5 
million deaths.39 Globally more than one quarter of 
the world’s population contracted the virus.40 
 
The origins of the 1918 pandemic are contested, 
but one important vector was undoubtedly the 
movement of troops towards the latter stages of 
the First World War. Military bases in the USA that 
supplied troops for the American Expeditionary 
Force (AEF) as well as troop contingents in 
Northern France have been identified as one 
breakout site. More recent epidemiology suggests 
that the virus was in circulation in the two years 
immediately preceding the pandemic.41 The 
pandemic struck the UK in at least three 
discernible waves. The first, in the spring of 1918; 
the second, and most deadly, in the winter of 1918; 
and the third wave in the early spring of 1919. 
However, newspapers continued to report smaller 
outbreaks of influenza for at least another two 
years.42 
 
A key contextual factor shaping the public and 
political response to the pandemic was the sheer 
uncertainty over what the disease was. Some 
senior medical practitioners and public health 
officials had experienced the earlier ‘Russian flu’ of 
1889-1892.43 However few lessons seemed to 
have been learned in the interim, indeed repeated 
influenza visitations arguably induced a degree of 
complacency.44 Virology remained in its infancy 
with medical science tending to the belief that 
influenza was a bacterium.45 This was significant 
since the smallpox epidemic of 1901-1904 had 
institutionalized a series of counter-measures for 
notifiable infectious diseases – including 
vaccination programmes.46 Influenza, however, 
was not a notifiable disease and vaccinations were 
not considered a worthwhile preventive measure, 
despite their use on military units.47 Added to this, 
nineteenth century ideas continued to shape 
thinking, with notions of the ‘miasma’, ‘bad air’, or 
‘ill wind’ still prevalent in both received wisdom and 
official advice. 
 
Crisis Narrative 
The First World War provides the central 
contextual factor shaping the official response. In 
material terms, there simply were not the 
resources for a comprehensive response. The war 
in Europe diverted medical practitioners away from 
the UK. Furthermore, the horrifying scale of 
fatalities as a result of the war had normalized 
death in such a way as to induce a degree of 
fatalism in the crisis narrative. Added to this, in the 
absence of comparative or time-series data, the 
public were given few tools to anticipate the future 
course of the outbreak, nor were policy elites 
willing to regularly narrate the chronology of 
deaths. Honigsbaum argues that war weariness 
encouraged an attitude of simply dealing with the 
crisis with a grim determination.48 Certain 
newspapers and public figures, including those 
within the medical profession, encouraged the idea 
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that worrying about the disease would increase 
one’s susceptibility to illness and even weaken the 
nation’s resolve in the war effort.49 In the words of 
Sir Arthur Newsholme, the Chief Medical Officer of 
the Local Government Board (LGB), the national 
circumstances compelled an individual duty to 
‘carry on’.50 The prevailing discourse behind the 
onset of the disease was therefore not one of a 
‘war’ or ‘battle’, even though the apparent 
viciousness of the influenza, and the speed at 
which it developed encouraged the language of an 
‘attack’.  
 
Despite the vectors appearing to come from troop 
movements, there was only occasional blame or 
responsibility accorded to soldiers.51 Unawareness 
of how the virus was spread meant attribution of 
blame tended to fall on a failure to observe proper 
sanitary habits.52 One frequent target of blame was 
the Local Government Board as the only 
organization capable of oversight of the public 
health response by local authorities. In 1918 the 
Ministry of Health did not exist; it came into 
existence partly as a response to the pandemic in 
1919. Public health was the responsibility of locally 
appointed Medical Officers of Health (MOHs), the 
Board of Education, and a number of ad-hoc 
bodies. This decentralization of public health 
generated disaggregated and uneven 
countermeasures to address the outbreak. Whilst 
the proactive MOH at Manchester, James Niven, 
issued a public advisory as early as June 1918 and 
closed schools,53 this was far from standard 
practice. The LGB did not issue blanket advice till 
the advent of the second wave in February 1919, 
advising ‘healthy living’, well-ventilated rooms, 
warm clothing, and gargling with a solution of salt, 
warm water, and potassium permanganate.54 But 
few councils reproduced this systematically. 
Brandy and whiskey remained a popular remedy. 
The Liverpool Medical Officer of Health, for 
instance, approved the release of larger rations by 
the excise authorities.55 Elsewhere, inspired by 
methods of eliminating vermin, a sanitary and 
chemistry expert at Hull came up with a novel 
solution, offering to gas ‘any street in Hull at my 
own expense as a demonstration. If you can gas 
vermin, why not influenza germs[?]’.56   
 
Death Management  
Structural factors also shaped the recording of 
influenza deaths. In the absence of a Health 
Ministry, death figures were collated and reported 
at the local and regional level – often through 
regional newspapers – and exhibited uneven 
practices. National figures, time series graphs, and 
international comparisons were available post-hoc 
in official publications,57 but were generally absent 
in real time, except anecdotally. As a result, the 
temporality of the crisis differed.58 Influenza’s 
status as a non-notifiable disease further 
complicated recording of deaths. Uncertainty over 
the nature of the disease led to recordings of 
‘pyrexia [fever] of unknown origin (POU)’. The co-
morbidities of pneumonia, bronchitis, heart 
disease, and phthisis (tuberculosis), were often 
reported in the death numbers alongside 
‘influenza’, obscuring the deadliness of the virus.59 
The absence of viral testing meant infection rates 
were not possible, whilst recovery rates were not 
reported. The wartime context also meant that 
‘civilian’ deaths were separated from military 
deaths. The latter were reported but not 
numerated. This further obscured the deadliness 
of the virus whilst adding to an overall ‘absenting 
of bodies’.60  
 
The virus proved disproportionately deadly to 
adults between the ages of 25-34, and women in 
particular.61 Whilst the gender ratios were 
overlooked, contemporary discourse privileged the 
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deaths of the young, with the death of children 
understandably marked out as particularly tragic.62 
Heroization was apparent in the disproportionate 
coverage afforded to the illness and deaths of 
serving police officers, health workers, and 
soldiers.63 Although the indiscriminate nature of 
fatalities, in terms of social class, was on occasion 
acknowledged,64 this somewhat sensationalist 
narrative obscured those statistics which suggest 
that the urban poor were disproportionately at 
risk.65 This was occasionally acknowledged in the 
press.66 
 
Funerals were not banned during the influenza 
pandemic, but body disposal was severely 
impacted by overworked undertakers, 
gravediggers, and coffin builders. Conscription led 
to a shortage in grave diggers and funeral workers. 
Even a shortage of horses and the low-quality feed 
available impacted on the provision of ambulances 
to remove the deceased.67 In Sunderland, for 
example, over 200 bodies were left unburied for 
over a week.68 
 
Mourning and Commemoration  
This research has been unable to find any public 
memorial in the UK to the 1918-1919 influenza 
pandemic. This reflects international practice, with 
New Zealand providing one exception. Youde 
points to the social function of memorialisation, 
and the manner in which this can be dominated by 
a state effect of selective commemoration. The 
ambivalence of the state to influenza deaths 
despite the scale of loss added to the wartime 
context provides an explanation for the absence of 
public grief. The difference that public 
commemoration may have made to preparedness 
in later pandemics is a key counter-factual and 
arguably provides one of the most compelling 
‘lessons’ from the 1918 pandemic. 
Conclusion  
Caution must be taken when comparing the 
present pandemic with the 1918 influenza 
outbreak in the UK. The wider context of the First 
World War and its aftermath was key in 
downplaying the crisis narrative. Rhetoric of a ‘war’ 
against the virus was absurd in this case. 
Scholarship has pointed to ‘war-weariness’ that 
seemed to shape the fatalism with which the 
outbreak was faced, but wider institutional, 
material, and social effects are apparent. The 
governing apparatus was radically different, and 
the paucity of virology expertise was decisive.  
 
The absence of an overarching health ministry 
created a disaggregated and uneven public health 
response. Rarely was the crisis grasped by 
governing elites, either rhetorically, or in practice. 
The material privations of the war added to the 
overwhelming demands on body management. 
Even though funerals were permitted, the sheer 
pace of death fostered a silencing of grief. Less 
acknowledged in the literature is the fact that the 
devastation visited on troops was also silenced.69 
Fighting men were permitted a hero’s death on the 
battlefield, but wartime restrictions meant 
reporting on the numbers killed by influenza was 
scarce.  
 
Crucially, the second wave of the pandemic, which 
was more deadly than the first, appeared to 
generate more outspoken opinion against the 
response of the local and national government. In 
the medium term, newspapers remained alive to 
the possibility of later ‘waves’ of influenza for a 
number of years, demonstrating the long-tail 
impact of the pandemic on public awareness. 
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United Kingdom 
Katharine M Millar  
‘I’ve got to be clear, we’ve all got to be 
clear, that this is the worst public health 
crisis for a generation…And it’s going to 
spread further and I must level with you, 
level with the British public, many more 
families are going to lose loved ones 
before their time’ – Boris Johnson, 
Prime Minister of the UK, 12 March 2020 
Background:i 
As of 31 July 2020, the UK had approx. 303,181 
cases of COVID-19 and 41,189 COVID-19 deaths.70 
Excess mortality calculations suggest total 
fatalities could be closer to 60,000.71 The first 
patients in the UK were diagnosed with COVID-19 
on 29 January; the first person in the UK died on 5 
March. The UK daily fatality total peaked on 21 
April, with 1,224 deaths; the record daily case total 
was 22 April at 5,505.72 
 
On March 16, Prime Minister Boris Johnson gave 
the first daily press briefing on COVID-19, asking 
the public to work from home and avoid public 
spaces.73 On 23 March 2020, Johnson issued a 
three-week stay-at-home order (‘lockdown’) 
requiring people to stay at home absent ‘essential’ 
activities.74 On 27 March, Johnson tested positive 
for COVID-19, and was eventually hospitalised 
before recovering.75 COVID-19 daily briefings were 
conducted from 16 March to 23 June by members 
 
i This case study is predominantly concerned with the UK 
government (Westminster). It should be noted, however, that 
the UK took a four nations approach to public health 
regulations, leading to differences in rules, expectations, and 
of Cabinet – particularly Health Secretary Matthew 
Hancock – alongside scientific advisors.76 The UK 
government was criticised for inconsistent 
messaging and guidance regarding permissible 
and impermissible actions during the stay-at-home 
order.77 This was compounded by the use of a four 
nations (Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and 
England) approach to pandemic management and 
communication. ‘Lockdown’ (for England) was 
considered to end on 4 July, ‘Super Saturday’, when 
service businesses were permitted to re-open and 
two households were able to spend time together 
indoors.78  Thirty COVID-19 deaths, on average, 
were reported each day that week.79 On 30 June, 
the UK government announced the first ‘local 
lockdown’ of Leicester, as the pandemic response 
shifted, in public presentation, from crisis reaction 
to management80. 
 
Crisis Narrative  
The official UK narrative of the COVID-19 crisis, 
very broadly, framed COVID-19 deaths as 
inevitable, while also producing an implicit 
hierarchy of grief and social value as to regarding 
lives lost.  
 
On 12 March, Johnson referred to COVID-19 as the 
‘worst public health crisis for a generation’, 
warning the UK public that ‘many more families are 
going to lose loved ones before their time’.81 On 
that day, 38 people in the UK had died of COVID-19, 
social distancing was not in place,82 and Johnson 
announced that track and trace measures would 
be halted, instead recording only COVID-19 cases 
in hospital.83 Following the 12 March statement, 
death and case numbers were reported daily by the 
public experiences of the pandemic in Northern Ireland, Wales, 
Scotland, and England - an important avenue for future 
comparative work.  
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Department of Health and Social Care, and often 
noted by the UK Cabinet members conducting the 
daily COVID-19 briefings. The UK did not track, and 
therefore did not publicize, COVID-19 recovery 
rates, centring death and risk of death within the 
UK COVID-19 crisis narrative.  
 
With a few exceptions – Health Secretary Hancock 
typically engaged with loss more than other 
Cabinet officials;84 Johnson published a letter in 
the Mail referencing the many victims of COVID-
1985 – official UK government communications 
seldom addressed the scale and social and 
emotional impact of COVID-19 deaths directly. The 
briefings – and Department of Health and Social 
Care twitter updates – typically made short 
acknowledgments of loss, noting that people have 
‘sadly died’.86 The death figures were often 
presented, however, in the context of overall 
pandemic recovery, worst case scenarios, and 
future planning, rather than as notable in their own 
right. This may be partially attributable to the 
briefings being conducted by an alternating array 
of Conservative politicians and public health 
officials, framing the pandemic as: a) a scientific, 
rather than political problem; and b) improving and 
manageable. By May, messaging included thanks 
to key workers and the public for their sacrifices, 
and more explicit references to grief,87 but with a 
continued emphasis upon the inevitability of death.  
 
The UK government did not pursue a zero-fatality 
COVID-19 strategy and primed the public to expect 
significant deaths. The implicit level of socially 
normalised death may be considered to be 
between 52 and 26 fatalities/day.88 These are the 
averages of daily reported fatalities for the week of 
23 June, when the government ceased daily 
briefings, and 6 July, when the Department of 
Health and Social care stopped tweeting daily 
death figures (though they remain available daily 
on the UK COVID-19 website).89 The normalisation 
of COVID-19 deaths has been publicly contested by 
opposition parties (particularly with respect to 
racialised disparity in death tolls),90 unions,91 and 
COVID-19 Bereaved Families for Justice, a group of 
450 families who lost loved ones.92 They argue 
that the scale of COVID-19 fatalities reflect 
government mismanagement and error, calling for 
a formal inquiry.93 
 
The treatment of death figures instrumentally, as 
evidence of a need to adhere to regulations and 
eventual progress, facilitated an avoidance of the 
mass social experience of loss. The UK lacked a 
‘mourner in chief’ to consistently convey empathy 
and officially acknowledge the mass loss of life. 
Two addresses made by the Queen in early April, 
which directly commented upon the loss of life, 
grief, vulnerability, and sacrifices, are exceptions to 
this overall trend.94  
 
The Queen’s initial statement on the pandemic 
invoked World War Two and the Blitz as a means 
of calling for solidarity and conveying British 
resilience. The ‘war frame’ was a common trope in 
early UK public COVID-19 narratives, though 
explicit analogies declined as the pandemic 
progressed. In early March, for instance, Johnson 
referred to the measures required to combat 
COVID-19 as unlike any seen since WWII, and 
framed the Conservatives as a ‘wartime 
government’.95 References to war were also 
common in popular discourse and the press – 
particularly the tabloids.96 Martial metaphors 
referring to fighting the virus, and to COVID-19 as 
an ‘enemy’ were common. The use of war 
analogies invoked nationalism to convey a sense 
of urgency, but also sense of order, hope, and rules 
compliance: collective sacrifice was a common 
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theme during lockdown. War frames were also, 
however, critiqued as: a) misrepresenting the 
nature of the crisis; b) suggesting that aggression 
and fear, rather than caring and protection were 
the appropriate response; and c) militarising a 
public health problem.97 The Blitz analogy was also 
turned against the government as death tolls rose, 
and it became likely that the approximately 44,000 
UK civilians killed in the Blitz would be exceeded by 
COVID-19 fatalities.98 The use of war frames 
declined through May and June as the peak of 
initial cases/fatalities passed. 
 
The war frame also played into a broader 
normalisation of death and hierarchicalisation of 
grief within the UK. Inspired by similar practices in 
continental Europe, the UK quickly recognised the 
contributions of health workers. The most famous 
example is the Clap for Carers campaign,99 but 
also included the proliferation of rainbow imagery 
associated with the National Health Service 
(NHS),100 adverts and public posters thanking the 
NHS,101 and frequent references to NHS workers by 
public officials. The government’s first official 
pandemic slogan ‘Stay Home, Save Lives, Protect 
the NHS’ reinforced this message,102 as the health 
system (and over-worked doctors, nurses, and 
hospital staff) were framed as in need of 
assistance from the public. Health workers were 
constructed as national heroes, not unlike soldiers 
in wartime. 
 
The ‘hero’ frame was shortly extended to other ‘key 
workers’,103 including transport,104 delivery, and 
retail workers.105 This heroization recognises their 
important public service, but also normalises death 
as a risk associated with health, caring, and other 
key occupations. Unions have observed and 
resisted the dangers of this frame.106 It posits key 
workers as potentially disposable in the pursuit of 
social and economic recovery.107 This created a 
hierarchy of grief that implied that those who are 
not considered to be economically essential, such 
as elderly and disabled people, were less 
deserving. Compounding this hierarchicalisation 
were the references to age and ‘underlying health 
conditions’ as risk factors related to fatalities, 
suggesting that some deaths were less 
preventable (and, implicitly, less sad and more 
acceptable) than others.108 
Death Management  
COVID-19 death tolls were reported on a daily and 
weekly basis and reported widely in the press. 
Comparisons with international death figures were 
included in daily briefings until 12 May, when the 
UK had the highest global excess death rate.109 
The initial reporting of the death figures was 
confused and understated. This was due to the 
fact that the four nations within the UK used 
slightly different definitions and practices of 
reporting COVID-19 deaths,110 leading to some 
discrepancies in COVID-19 fatality numbers.111 
Until 29 April, moreover, Public Health England 
recorded only deaths in hospital due to COVID-19 
in its reporting, meaning that care home fatalities 
were excluded from daily briefings by Department 
of Health and Social Care briefings.112 This 
obscured deaths of the elderly and misstated the 
severity of the pandemic to the public for the first 
six weeks. 
 
COVID-19 fatalities reflected both global trends 
and existing patterns of socio-economic disparity, 
health inequality, and racial and ethnic 
marginalisation within the UK. 91 per cent of 
people who died of COVID-19 had pre-existing 
conditions; older people were substantially more at 
risk of COVID-19 death than younger; and men 
were 50 per cent more likely to die of COVID-19 
than women.113 Socio-economically deprived areas 
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also experienced higher COVID-19 death rates.114 
People belonging to Black, Asian, and minority 
ethnic (BAME) communities were also found to be 
at substantially higher risk of dying from COVID-
19,115 due to the continuation of socio-economic 
and health inequalities, as well as racism and 
discrimination.116 
 
Funeral and mortuary practices were subject to 
regulation. As regulatory specifics relating to 
hospital visitation, body transport/storage, and 
funerals were delegated to local authorities,117 
there was substantial variation in death 
management – and the experience of loss – 
across the UK. Many hospitals severely restricted 
or stopped hospital visits. Many people died 
without loved ones present and survivors 
experienced distress at their inability to say 
goodbye or offer comfort in person.118  Unlike 
many countries, the UK did not mandate cremation 
of the bodies of COVID-19 fatalities, but did relax 
the regulation of cremation to expedite the 
process.119 The UK sought to expand its mortuary 
capacity by 30,000 places through the construction 
of temporary mortuaries.120 Some temporary 
mortuaries were criticised for their failures to 
adhere to appropriate PPE protocols, train new 
staff, and treat the deceased with dignity.121 
Several local authorities dug new graves in 
anticipation of COVID-19 fatalities.122 
 
Funerals were officially permitted, but socially 
distant and severely restricted in numbers.123 
Some crematoriums did not permit attendants at 
all.124 Many people chose to forego a funeral 
entirely, instead choosing ‘direct cremation’ of the 
deceased, which is less expensive but also a less 
formal marking of death.125 Many people dealt with 
grief in isolation, often compounded by guilt at an 
inability to conduct appropriate funerals and/or 
religious services.126 Minoritised religious and 
cultural groups were particularly affected by 
funeral and mortuary regulations that prohibited 
family members from attending the bodies of 
loved ones, as is common within Jewish and 
Muslim religious and cultural practices.127 
Religious leaders and funeral directors reported 
being overwhelmed with the volume of the 
deceased, and the difficulty in consoling the 
bereaved absent social contact and conventional 
services.128  
 
Interestingly, absent a few isolated instances of 
abuse of funeral workers, there appears to have 
been little public contestation of these 
restrictions.129 The most notable was a small 
group of Conservative MPs calling for the Church 
of England to resume services prior to the Church 
deeming it safe.130 Charities, religious leaders, and 
the bereaved noted that the disruption of 
traditional mourning intensified the pain and 
experience of grief, with some recommending that 
remembrances or services be held at a later 
date.131  
Mourning and Commemoration 
Ad hoc commemorative practices – and calls for 
memorialisation of COVID-19 fatalities – are taking 
place across the UK.  
 
Mass and/or national-level commemoration has, 
thus far, tended to again emphasize the sacrifices 
of key workers – particularly health workers. These 
practices include the Thursday evening ‘Clap for 
Carers’;132 a minute’s silence for deceased health 
workers on International Workers’ Day (28 April);133 
and the celebration of the NHS’s 75th birthday on 5 
July.134 Initial coverage of individual COVID-19 
deaths – rather than total fatalities – in the press 
also emphasized the deaths of healthcare 
workers.135 There have been calls to add a figure of 
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a health worker to a planned ‘999’ monument in 
Central London;136 a monument to NHS workers at 
the National Arboretum, a space for recognising 
self-sacrifice and public (usually military) service, 
has also been discussed.137 
 
These practices demonstrate a blurring of 
commemoration – of an important event and 
social contribution – and memorialisation of the 
deceased in remembering COVID-19. This is 
compounded by a tendency to recognise the dead 
through their occupations. A memorial to 
deceased transport workers, for instance, has been 
proposed for Victoria Station, London.138 This 
further normalises the deaths of key and health 
workers as sad, but potentially necessary or 
understandable, in the service of not only the 
health of others, but the economy overall.139  
 
Thus far, no official national government plans 
have been announced for the commemoration of 
COVID-19 or memorialisation of victims. The most 
prominent effort to recognise all of the deceased, 
rather than solely key workers, was a moment of 
silence declared for the evening of 4 July, prior to 
the NHS’s birthday the following day, that asked 
the public to light a candle for the dead.140 Layla 
Moran of the Liberal Democrats called for a 
national memorial to all COVID-19 fatalities on 19 
July.141 Given the scale of death, individuated 
memorialisation, such as obituaries, that recognise 
dignity and loss of each person, has been 
challenging. Many media organisations have made 
efforts to collect and publicise tributes to the 
dead.142 To date, the St. Paul’s (virtual) Book of 
Remembrance – announced on 22 May and 
supported by Prince Charles143 –  is the only place 
of national symbolic significance where the names 
of all deceased may be recorded and 
memorialised.  
 
There is also a proliferation of local and regional 
commemorations and memorialisations. As these 
are continually emerging and not recorded in a 
central manner, it is difficult to generalise about 
their form and content. They seem, however, unlike 
more official or national efforts, to distinguish less 
between key workers and other COVID-19 fatalities, 
providing a space for mourning all deceased within 
communities. These memorialisation and 
commemoration sites range from walking trails;144 
memorial gardens at care homes, crematoriums, 
and on private land;145 to conventional statuary 
monuments.146 Memorial gardens are common 
(particularly in the UK) in instances where the scale 
of death challenges individuated 
memorialisation.147 
 
The scale of COVID-19 death and loss has yet to be 
explicitly prioritised at the national level. Local 
commemoration efforts address this challenge but 
are less able to provide symbolic recognition of 
loss, and communicate the diversity of the overall 
UK experience of grief than national efforts. The 
Black Lives Matter movement brought 
commemorative culture to public consciousness in 
the UK in June, effectively connecting racial 
disparities in COVID-19 death to broader processes 
of discrimination.148 It is therefore likely that 
moves towards COVID-19 commemoration will 
involve negotiations and contestations of its 
appropriate form, content, and representation of 
community experiences and differences 
within/between groups.  
  
Conclusion 
The United Kingdom suffered the greatest COVID-
19 fatalities from January-July 2020 (and to date) 
of the countries considered here. It is therefore 
significant that official UK COVID-19 discourses 
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place a great deal of emphasis upon death as a) 
inevitable and b) an important indicator of 
pandemic recovery/success rather than a mass 
experience of loss and grief. There are benefits to 
this approach, in attempting to cultivate hope, 
solidarity, and individual sacrifice/inconvenience 
for the protection of others. It has also, however, 
resulted in an official and publicly-circulating 
narrative of the COVID-19 pandemic as first a 
crisis, and now a challenge, to the NHS – and, 
perhaps most centrally – the economy. The 
resumption of ‘normal’ life, rather than recognising 
the loss of 40,000 to 60,000 people (and potentially 
more, in a ‘second wave’), has become the focal 
point of the UK crisis narrative.  
 
There is a risk, in either avoiding discussions of 
loss or treating it indirectly in the context of 
recovery, that official narratives and policy become 
disconnected from popular experiences of COVID-
19 death, grief, and the emotional processing of 
the potentiality of death and loss. The failure to 
centre death in COVID-19 narratives may facilitate 
a social and political forgetting that undermines 
public health planning (including for future ‘waves’ 
of COVID-19). The recent shift from excluding care 
home deaths from Public Health England fatality 
reporting, which served to socially normalise the 
risks of COVID-19 to the elderly, to recent 
campaigns warning young people not to ‘kill [their] 
Granny’ exemplifies this problem.149  
 
Moreover, UK citizens’ experiences of COVID-19 
grief, loss, and risk varies substantially. Failing to 
recognise the differential vulnerability to, and 
experience of, death by particular communities and 
groups within the UK may therefore inadvertently 
produce the opposite effect to that intended by 
‘recovery’ oriented narratives. For example, 
Islamophobic rhetoric has accompanied local 
lockdowns in the North of England, as Muslim 
communities and families are wrongly blamed for 
rising cases,150 and the differential toll of COVID-19 
on minoritised racial, ethnic, and religious groups, 
as well as poorer people, is under-acknowledged.  
 
There is therefore also a risk that working ‘around’ 
death in official narratives and policies results in 
the formation of a simplistic collective memory of 
the pandemic that excludes marginalised and 
minoritised communities and perpetuates social 
divisions (of race, class, region, citizenship status, 
etc). The UK’s management and narrativization of 
the pandemic thus far strongly risks undermining 
social solidarity and the production of an inclusive 
social order. Dissatisfaction with the existing order 
can already be seen in the rise of protests 
concurrent with the pandemic. Some, such as the 
Black Lives Matter Movement and Extinction 
Rebellion, highlighting existing social cleavages, 
failings, and power dynamics that exacerbate the 
crisis, while others, such as anti-lockdown protests 
in August and September, 151 contest the severity 
of the crisis. 
 
Overall, the UK experience indicates that the 
empirical fact of death, and its technocratic 
management, does not mark the end of the social 
and political relevance and experience of loss, but 
rather its beginning, as the inability to meaningfully 
address death as it occurs extends it in time. The 
effects of COVID-19 deaths on UK, in addition to 
short-term challenges to social cohesion, are likely 
to extend into the medium and long term, as issues 
of public recognition of different 
experiences/losses by different groups and 
communities within UK, and the formation of 
collective memory are negotiated. 
 
22          Confronting the COVID-19 Pandemic  
‘It has become tragically clear that fatal 
mistakes have been made by the 
government […]. As the staggering 
statistics continue to roll in, so too do 
the stories of personal tragedy […] 
[E]very one of those statistics was a 
living breathing person, taken before 
their time […]. For many, the wounds 
caused by their loss will never truly heal. 
For those left behind there is pain, 
confusion and a sense of having been 
failed by the system that should be 
protecting them.’ - Matt Fowler, co-
founder of COVID-19 Bereaved Families 
for Justice, 12 June statement 
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Italy  
Irene Morlino 
‘These are terrible days for our 
community, for the national community. 
Every day we are forced to register new 
deaths: it is a pain for our community 
that is continuously renewed, we lose 
the most fragile, the most vulnerable. 
We would never have thought, in our 
country, to look at images picturing rows 
of army trucks parading full with coffins 
of our fellow citizens. Mine, our heartful 
thought, and emotional proximity goes to 
their families.’’ –Giuseppe Conte, 
President of the Council, 26 March 2020 
Background 
Italy was the first country in Europe to be reached 
by COVID-19. Two tourists from China were 
confirmed to have COVID-19 on 31 January 2020; 
the first instance of community transmission was 
diagnosed on 18 February, in Codogno, 
Lombardy.152 During the last week of February, the 
village and region quickly became the epicentre of 
the pandemic. Initially, the government and local 
authorities of Lombardy were hesitant to take rapid 
action to tackle the spreading of COVID-19. The 
last week of February is now recognised as a lost 
opportunity to contain the outbreak.153 National 
authorities imposed a progressive lockdown of the 
North of Italy on  23 February. On 9 March, the 
whole country was declared to be under lockdown. 
The peak of fatalities was reached on 27 March, 
with 86 000 cases of infections and 969 deaths. 
When the infections began decreasing in April, 
lockdown measures were loosened.  On 4 May, the 
so-called ‘second phase’ of the Italian COVID-19 
response began with the re-opening of bars and 
restaurants and the resumption of travel within the 
same region.154 This was followed by the ‘third 
phase’, beginning on 3 June, when travel within 
Italy resumed and borders were re-opened. By 31 
July, Italy had experienced 247,537 cases of 
COVID-19, including infected (12,422), deaths 
(35,141), and recovered (199,974). 155 
 
Crisis Narrative  
There were two main trends in the Italian crisis 
narratives: first, the framing of the pandemic as a 
war; second, a narrative mourning ‘an entire 
generation passing away’, with particular emphasis 
on elders.  
 
The key actors shaping the crisis narratives in Italy 
were the government and the press. The Civil 
Protection Department, responsible for risk 
prevention and intervention following an 
emergency, held a daily press conference and 
briefing communicating the number of infections, 
deaths, recoveries, referencing scientific and 
statistical data. The briefings took place every day 
at 6pm during the lockdown and were transmitted 
on the main national channel (Rai Uno). The 
President of the Council (PoC) Giuseppe Conte 
periodically delivered public speeches to the 
nation, Senate and Parliament. In general, the PoC, 
together with the Head of State (HoS), Sergio 
Mattarella, were always present in the public 
discourse. This gave a sharp sense that health was 
prioritised over economic interests. Conte declared 
that health was a top priority for the government156 
and set up a Scientific and Technical Committee 
on February 2020 tasked with providing guidelines 
for managing the pandemic.157 This was reinforced 
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by Conte’s insistence that: ‘The State is here. 
Nobody will be left alone’.158 
 
In public speeches, the PoC urged the public to 
follow lockdown rules, adopt social distancing and 
follow hygiene practices. He also advocated for 
taking appropriate, scientifically-based measures 
to curb the spread of the pandemic. These 
speeches also discussed the social and economic 
provisions required to address the disruption of 
COVID-19.159 Together with the HoS, Conte also 
conveyed messages of solidarity, grief, ‘official 
sadness’ and hope.160 Importantly, his statements 
frequently featured expressions such as ‘fighting 
an invisible enemy’ and ‘our battle’, thus framing 
the pandemic as a war. Again, alongside the HoS, 
he consistently referred to the pandemic as ‘a 
challenge’, ‘a crisis’, ‘an emergency’.  
 
The press also contributed to this form of crisis 
narrative. The media  directly defined the 
pandemic ‘as a war’, and used expressions such as 
‘darkest hour’, ‘doctors in trenches’, ‘silent 
enemy’.161 Thus, during lockdown, official and 
media narratives were dominated by references to 
death and infection rates, as well as war framing, 
rather than either individual or economic/social 
recovery. This generated a general sense of fear 
and, for a large part of the population, appeared to 
be translated into a sense of duty and 
responsibility to respect the rules. High fines 
(ranging from € 400 to € 3000) also contributed to 
general adherence to fairly strict rules (e.g. 
mandatory masks and gloves, social distancing, 
funeral restrictions, movement restrictions).162 
Though Italy is often understood to be a  fairly 
fragmented society traditionally distrustful of state 
institutions,163 the period of lockdown saw a high 
degree of rule abiding behaviour and solidaristic 
social action. 
 
The popular sense of fear was also the 
consequence of the second type of crisis narrative 
adopted primarily by the press, expressing concern 
over ‘an entire generation [of elderly Italians] 
passing away’.164 Within a societal context of an 
aging population and highly important family 
bonds,165 the loss of elderly people was particularly 
striking. The average age of Italian COVID-19 
fatalities was 81 years old.166 This narrative, which 
was also reflected in government statements, 
implied that the primary aim of the pandemic 
response was to avoid the deaths of elderly 
people. This suggested that citizens’ health was 
the government’s top priority, and required a mass, 
shared effort. In the words of PoC Conte, 
‘Everyone's effort is needed [...] the government’s 
top priority is to protect citizen’s fundamental right 
to health […] we protect the freedom of each citizen 
from the disease and death’.167 The attention to 
older people was magnified by a mid-April Corriere 
della Sera investigation focussing on Lombardy. It 
revealed that the decision to close care homes to 
external visits came late into the pandemic (4 
March). Even more importantly, on 8 March the 
regional government moved patients considered 
‘less infected’ into care homes to create more 
space for intensive care in the hospitals. Many 
people living in care homes died as a result. The 
event, known as the ‘Trivulzio scandal’ (after the 
name of the care home), was defined as a 
‘massacre’ by the press.168 A judicial inquiry 
investigating the government (in particular, the 
PoC, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of 
Health)  for ‘multiple manslaughters’ and ‘wrongful 
exposure’ soon followed.169 Thus, widespread 
press attention was not on people who recovered 
from COVID-19 but on the dead.   
In this context, health workers, as well as 
individuals and those belonging to civil society, 
such as charitable organisations, who showed 
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solidarity at the local level, were framed as 
‘heroes’. On 2 June, as part of ceremonies marking 
the anniversary of the Republic, HoS Sergio 
Mattarella awarded the Order of Merit to 57 
people. This included doctors, nurses, teachers 
and volunteers who gave their support to the 
community by hand-fabricating thousands of 
masks, cooking food for nurses and doctors, 
helping victims of violence domestic violence, 
crowdfunding to buy computers and tablets for 
poorer students, etc.170 Although the media 
emphasised the deaths of nurses and doctors, 
defined by the press, again, as ‘a never-ending 
massacre’,171 the deaths of elderly people were 
considered particularly tragic. This created an 
implicit hierarchy of grief, with elderly people at the 
‘top’, followed very closely by the deaths of doctors 
and nurses. This hierarchy facilitated a reading of 
adhering to lockdown and public health rules as 
expressing respect and concern for elderly people, 
health workers, and other key workers ‘who put 
their lives at risk to guarantee cures and 
services’.172 This, at least temporarily, fostered a 
sense of duty and solidarity.  
 
It is important to note that the effect of COVID-19 
on minoritised and marginalised groups within Italy 
did not feature highly in the broader public 
pandemic narratives. This may be partially 
attributed to the fact that Italy is less racially and 
ethnically diverse than, for instance, Germany and 
the UK.173 Italian party leaders do not centre the 
issue in their agendas; most of the press does the 
same. This likely reflects the marginalisation and 
non-integration of some minoritised communities 
(and refugees) within broader Italian society.174 In 
July and August, following the resumption of 
migrant and refugees arrivals, the popular debate 
that between February and June only focused on 
the pandemic started again to revolve around 
migration.175 The extreme right, in particular, 
criticized the government about the way it handled 
the arrivals, accusing it of adopting ‘too soft’ 
measures.176 Tensions between migrants and local 
populations were particularly pronounced in 
Southern Italy (e.g. Sicily and Calabria) as regions 
refused to host those who tested positive to 
COVID-19.177 In August, the government decided to 
isolate new migrants and refugees on a cruise 
ferry off the Sicilian coast.178 In contrast to the UK, 
the government and press did not meaningfully 
discuss issues of differential vulnerabilities to 
COVID-19 or its social impact.  
 
Finally, based on scientific research, the 
government began to loosen lockdown measures 
first on 4 May, then further on 3 June. This period 
may therefore be taken as a proxy for the implicit 
social normalisation of a particular rate of death. A 
study by the Statistics National Institute (ISTAT) 
and by the Ministry of Health, conducted between 
15 May and 15 July, shows that the ratio between 
deaths and the total infections in Italy was 
reasonably low, around 2.14%.179 In addition, 
starting from the end of March, there was a slow 
but progressive decrease of deaths and infections. 
In March deaths were 15,133 and those positive to 
COVID-19 amounted to 113,351; by June, when the 
third phase of loosening restrictions began, there 
were 1,292 deaths and 6,967 infections.180  
 
Death Management  
The number of deaths, infections and recoveries, 
was daily communicated by the Civil Protection 
Department based on scientific collection of data. 
According to this data, elderly people have been 
the primary victims of the pandemic. Since the 
start of the emergency, the average death age was 
81 years old.181 According to the Italian National 
Institute of Health (Istituto Superiore della Sanità, 
ISS), there has not been a significant difference 
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between Italians and ethnic minorities with respect 
to COVID-19. In the words of the ISS director: ‘It is 
possible to refute the hypothesis of a difference 
between Italians and foreigners’.182 Data from April, 
indicates that foreign communities with the 
highest number of infected were Romanian, 
Peruvian, Albanian, Ecuadorian, Moroccan, and 
Ukrainian.183 Regionally, Lombardy was most 
affected by the pandemic, and, as a result, 
struggled with death management – notably in 
Bergamo.184 On 18 March, the day later chosen as 
a national day of remembrance, 70 military trucks 
transported bodies that could not be buried in the 
city's cemetery to other regions.185  
 
The Ministry of Health, supplemented by local 
guidelines, regulated death management and body 
storage. Access by relatives in care homes and 
hospitals was severely restricted. Public discourse 
around these restrictions again focussed on the 
impact on the elderly. The press expressed a sense 
of broad distress at ‘the tragedy of dying alone’ 
and the ‘tragedy’ of those relatives that could not 
‘bid farewell’ to their dears.186 The suspension to 
funerals stayed in place until 4 May as well as the 
restriction on visits to cemeteries.187  Nationally, 
funerals were suspended but cremation, although 
more practiced, was not mandated. Only religious 
officials were allowed to be at the 
burial/cremation.188 During the second phase of 
the pandemic response, a maximum of 15 people 
could attend funerals, which, under new rules, were 
required to be held outdoors. The measures taken 
for Catholic communities were the same for 
Jewish and Muslim communities. All religious 
services started again on  18 May.189 After 3 June, 
more people were allowed to participate in 
funerals, and religious services may also be held 
indoors, if the place of worship is big enough to 
guarantee social distancing.  
 
Despite a general understanding of the public 
health rationale behind the restrictions, the 
suspension on funerals caused a widespread 
malaise. As Italy is a largely Catholic country, 
funerals and related services are considered a 
fundamental ritual for grieving and a time of pain 
processing in a context of sorrow.190 Catholic 
associations and right-wing parties picked up the 
issue and presented the restrictions to funerals 
and masses as a limit on freedom of religion.191 
This resulted in a heated debate with the PoC, who 
advocated for caution in re-opening Italian society. 
On 4 May, a compromise was reached between the 
government and all Jewish, Catholic, Muslim 
communities on when and how to hold funerals 
and ceremonies. The compromise consisted in 
opening the places of worship on 18 May and in 
the optional measurement of the temperature 
before attending liturgical ceremonies and 
funerals.192 
‘[…] The victims of the invisible war die 
like during the times of the plague, and 
many people die alone. Elderlies, 
especially. One dies in the hospital or at 
home. The Coronavirus does not allow 
for a last good-bye.’ --La Repubblica, 17 
March 2020 
Mourning and Commemoration 
Following the high number of deaths, particularly 
of the elderly, and the suspension of funerals, 
mourning and commemoration became extremely 
important both during and after lockdown. 
Mourning and commemoration occurred at many 
levels: the central state, local authorities, single 
citizens and in the press. At the state level, the 
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Head of State is the main conveyor of grief. For 
instance, in his speech, during a commemoration 
ceremony in Bergamo on 28 June, Sergio 
Mattarella highlighted the importance of 
remembering those who passed away: ‘to 
remember means to reflect seriously, with rigorous 
precision, on what did not work, on system 
shortcomings, on errors to avoid to be repeated’.193 
He also participated in numerous initiatives at the 
local level. He paid tribute, for instance, attending 
the cemetery of Codogno to honour the victims of 
COVID-19.194  
 
Another official initiative came from the 
Parliament, which recently approved a law 
establishing 18 March as a symbolic national day 
in memory of the COVID-19 victims.195 State 
initiatives were dedicated to memorialising all the 
victims, without, interestingly, a noticeable 
emphasis upon the deaths of health or key 
workers. As per local authorities, each region had 
mourning and commemoration initiatives that 
ranged from concerts to religious services to 
sports events. There have, for instance, been 
several concerts dedicated to thanking health 
workers.196 In addition, 31 March, all mayors 
observed a minute of silence for the dead and all 
major institutions flew their flags at half-mast.197 
Local monuments in honour of COVID-19 victims 
are in the process of being constructed.198 Citizens 
also participated in clapping outdoors at a 
designated time, home concerts, and rainbow 
drawings. The latter, in particular, were intended to 
thank health workers. Taken together, these 
initiatives were both a way to give strength and 
courage and, again, perhaps, in contrast to other 
cases, to remember those who passed away.199 
Facebook groups, similarly, have been created as a 
place to share the life and memories of those who 
passed away.200 Finally, at the beginning of June, 
Corriere della Sera dedicated an entire supplement 
to the COVID-19 victims, reporting their names, 
their stories and their pictures and underlining 
‘those are not just numbers, they are people, they 
are lives’.201 
‘Our life will not be as it used to because 
we will miss loved ones, friends, 
colleagues. It will not be as it used to, 
because the collective suffering that we 
all suddenly experienced has 
certainly affected everyone's life and the 
way we look at reality. It affected the 
priorities, the order of value attributed to 
things, the importance of feeling 
responsible for each other. […] 
Remembering, therefore, means, first of 
all, remember our dead and also means 
becoming fully aware of what happened. 
Without the illusory temptation to put 
aside these dramatic months so to start 
again as before.’—Sergio Mattarella, 
President of the Republic of Italy, 28 
June 2020   
 
Conclusion 
The narratives adopted by Italian institutions and 
the press emphasised death rather than recovery. 
This generated a sense of fear as well as a sense 
of respect for those who passed away, especially 
elders, and for the service and sacrifice of health 
workers. This sense of generalised apprehension,  
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together with legal penalties, facilitated solidarity 
and respect for the rules, somewhat surprisingly 
solidifying social order during the months of 
lockdown. Contrary to the UK, where death was 
considered inevitable and herd immunity was 
initially advocated,202 the Italian approach to death 
was explicitly characterised by loss and grief. 
Death was framed as something to be avoided at 
all costs, underscored by the state’s obligation to 
protect the health of its citizens. In this context, the 
impossibility to hold funerals was particularly 
disruptive in the Italian case, fuelling disputes 
between the government and religious (especially 
Catholic) communities. Similarly, contrary to the 
UK, where there have not yet been national efforts 
for public commemoration yet, Italy has seen many 
official commemoration ceremonies. The state 
(especially the HoS), as well as parliament and 
local authorities, consistently conveyed messages 
of mourning and was present at official 
commemoration ceremonies. Parliament and local 
authorities were also officially involved. 
 
Furthermore, the general fear of death and the 
sense of duty had, at least initially, a positive, 
solidaristic effect on social order – not unusual, in 
a crisis -  and might be considered as ‘a lesson 
learnt’. Anti-lockdown protests and those 
organised by extreme-right parties (e.g. Lega per 
Salvini premier, and Fratelli d'Italia), pro-socially 
(and somewhat ironically), did not take place until 
the third phase of decreased restrictions on 3 
June. During the months of lockdown, though 
Matteo Salvini attempted to organise protests and 
gather people, the initiative was overlooked and did 
not take place.203  That said, though religious, 
racial, and ethnic minorities do not appear to have 
experience COVID-19 in a differential manner, it is 
reasonable to believe that already marginalised 
groups will be particularly adversely affected by 
the economic crisis – and social consequences – 
that appears imminent. On 9 July, the Ministry of 
Interior, suggested it is likely that social tensions 
will rise in the upcoming months.204 The longevity 
of the gains in inclusivity and solidarity seen during 
the height of the COVID-19 crisis therefore remains 
to be seen; it is possible this period only briefly 
obscured the continuing relevance of underlying 
structures of inequality. 
 
Overall, three aspects of COVID-19 fatalities, and 
their public management/narration, differentiate 
Italy from the UK: a) the strong emphasis on 
avoiding death and on elders; b) lesser to little 
emphasis on minoritised groups (partially due 
differences in underlying social fabric); and c) the 
proliferation of official commemorations. That 
said, for Italy, as for the UK (and likely all states), 
the effects of COVID-19 deaths on social order will 
most probably be not only short term but also 
medium and long term. The social, emotional, and 
economic impact of these months could foster 
existing trends of fragmentation, at both the 
national and local level. Indeed,205 the country is 
characterised by ‘localism and social 
particularism’, meaning that Italians are especially 
attached to ‘local, familial and individual 
interests’.206 Thus, the crisis is expected to 
accentuate these dynamics, leading to the further 
erosion of  national social cohesion, especially if 
the current policies associated with the Recovery 
Fund do not succeed. As noted above, the likely 
economic crisis can also be expected to 
exacerbate existing differences. The economic, 
social and educational gap between North and 
South is likely to widen and deepen. The already 
existing aversion towards migrants is at risk of 
increasing, as  local communities fear of a 
resurgence of the virus brought ‘from overseas’.207 
On a positive final note, however, greater political 
attention and allocation of resources towards 
health, and care for the elderly, is also quite likely – 
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and may foster increased social and emotional 
investment in state institutions. 
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South Korea 
Yuna Han 
‘We have already become a leading 
nation in pandemic response. K-
Prevention [Korea’s epidemic response 
system] has become a global 
standard’—Moon Jae-In, President of 
the Republic of Korea, 10th May 2020   
 
Background 
The first confirmed COVID-19 case in South Korea 
was on the 20th of January 2020.208 The office of 
the presidency released its first press briefing 
focused on the virus on 2nd January, stating that 
President Moon Jae-in was briefed on the 
transmission of the virus and response by the 
Korean Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(KCDC). It quoted the President expressing 
concern during a Cabinet meeting, regarding 
containment of the virus during the upcoming 
Lunar New Year holidays and its potential impact 
on the economy.209  On 1 February, the KCDC held 
its first regular daily briefing, which have continued 
throughout the course of the pandemic.210 The 
government raised the infectious disease crisis 
alert to red (highest level) on 23 February, 
convening the Central Disaster and Safety 
Countermeasures Headquarters (hereafter CDH) to 
coordinate and direct responses by different 
ministries and local authorities.211 On 22 March, 
high intensity social distancing policy was put in 
place, mandating that all non-essential businesses 
 
ii This project does not take into account events that occurred 
after the 31st of July, and thus does not reflect the on-going 
‘second wave.’ 
and social activities, including school, be 
cancelled. Workplaces, including public services, 
were strongly encouraged to transition to home 
office and flexible working arrangements. 
Individuals were also encouraged to reduce travel 
outside of the house and to adopt basic hygiene 
measures.212  On 6 June, the government officially 
transitioned to an ‘in-life distancing’ model, in 
which most everyday economic and social 
activities were allowed, but with additional 
requirements such as physical distancing and 
mask-wearing.213 Overall, the government has 
tended to use localised restrictions and shorter-
term lockdown measures to control transmission, 
and prioritised the implementation of a 
comprehensive testing and tracing system. 
 
As of 31st July 2020, there have been a total of 
11,909 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 301 
deaths reported. Daegu—the fourth largest city in 
South Korea with approximately 2.465 million 
residents—was the epicentre of the pandemic 
during its first peak with 6,942 confirmed COVID-
19 patients (48.2% of all confirmed patients) to 
date and 191 deaths (63.5% of all COVID-19 related 
deaths).ii  
 
Crisis Narrative 
There are three distinct trends in the South Korean 
crisis narrative shaped by the government: first, the 
narrative of ‘civic consciousness’; second, the 
narrative of ‘global standard-setting’ ‘success’ in 
the country’s response to the pandemic; and  third, 
the narrative of long-term struggle. Narrative 
frames about the crisis also highlight dimensions 
of international cooperation and recognition. 
Narrative trends do not focus on the experience of 
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death and death rates; more emphasis is placed on 
transmission rates and recovery numbers. This is 
clearly made possible by the comparably low death 
rates. This does not, however, mean that 
government discourse did not reference COVID-19 
deaths, as discussed more in detail in the 
subsequent section.   
 
The key actor shaping the crisis narrative is the 
CDH, formally led by the Prime Minister. 
Operationally, the CDH is led by the KCDC; it is also 
comprised of the Ministries of Health and Interior. 
Daily press briefings are led by the KCDC, by either 
the director (Jung Eun-Kyeong) or her deputy 
(Kwon Joon-Wook), and the CDH releases regular 
public updates. The division of labour between 
affective messaging (communicating sentiments 
of grief and solidarity) and more technocratic 
aspects of messaging (such as guidelines for 
social distancing) is not always clear. While the 
KCDC is leading the technocratic messaging, the 
daily press briefings led by KCDC leadership also 
directly convey messages of grief, suffering, and 
loneliness. For example, a description of a fatality 
case is always followed by a message of 
condolence to the family and loved ones of the 
decedent. Messaging in the South Korean model is 
thus marked by different technocratic intervention 
objectives. The KCDC communicates the lion’s 
share of the public health related policies and 
manages sentiments around them, with the rest of 
the political leadership (e.g. President) also 
communicating economic policies related to 
COVID-19 and their affective impact on society. As 
discussed below, these narratives are not always 
aligned.  
 
The CDH frames pandemic response as a form of 
‘civic consciousness’ and emphasises collective 
participation in local and national actions.214 This 
includes, for instance, encouraging people to avoid 
hoarding supplies, particularly masks, in order to 
support the medical community. 215 References to 
‘local community,’ both in the context of local 
transmission as well as pandemic responses such 
as social distancing, are frequent.216 War framing is 
not commonly used by the CDH,217 but can be seen 
in public narratives in the mainstream media. 
Rather than invoking public support and solidarity, 
as seen in some of the other cases, war framing in 
South Korea was used to convey the difficulty, 
chaos, and horror of the pandemic, particularly 
from the perspective of medical professionals.218 
War framing was used sporadically by both the 
government and opposition parties in the leadup to 
the April 2020 parliamentary elections.219  
 
Despite efforts to show a unified front by the 
political elites and the more technocratic 
leadership of the KCDC and Ministry of Health, 
fractures in the narrative framings are becoming 
increasingly visible the longer the pandemic 
persists, particularly with regard to the narrative of 
‘success’. Top politicians, particularly President 
Moon Jae-In, frequently portray South Korea’s 
response to the pandemic (at times branded as ‘K-
Prevention’) as a ‘global standard.’220 Media 
narratives are also sensitive to the framing of the 
pandemic response as a ‘success case’ 
internationally.221 Conversely, the KCDC and other 
operational members of the CDH frame the 
pandemic as a ‘long term’ struggle, highlighting 
uncertainty and the need for continued patience.222 
In February, for example, the President declared 
the crisis to have ‘come close to the end’223—a 
message that was quickly refuted by the CDH, 
which reiterated its framing of the pandemic 
response as a long-term challenge.224 As 
discussed below, the eagerness of the political 
leadership to declare the pandemic response as a 
‘success’—largely based on lowering community 
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transmission rates—is considered by some 
members of the public to be insensitive to grief 
and loss as experienced by some, and may provide 
future flashpoints of social tension.  
 
Public discourse implicitly frames COVID-19 as 
part of a broader phenomenon, both in terms of 
international cooperation and as one instance of a 
series of epidemic experiences (albeit an extreme 
one). There are frequent reports on South Korean 
cooperation with the WHO and health aid provided 
to other countries.225 For example, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs publicized how testing kits used by 
KCDC were provided to developing countries, 
particularly those like Ethiopia that were part of the 
UN force that fought in the Korean Civil War.226  
President Moon, in a virtual speech at the WHO 
World Health Assembly, stated that a successful 
pandemic response ‘does not think of neighbours 
as dangerous subjects that can spread the virus 
and blockade them’ and that the definition of a 
neighbour ‘crosses national borders.’227 Previous 
instances of viral epidemics, such as MERs or 
SARS, are also noted by officials and media reports 
and, interestingly, framed as less successful 
pandemic response efforts (i.e. ‘lessons 
learned’).228 
 
There is no clear recognition of differentiated risks 
of death experienced by different members of 
society, including minoritised groups (such as 
ethnic or sexual minorities). This is against a 
broader social context in which South Korean 
society is frequently represented as internally 
homogenous. However, the additional risks 
minoritised groups face when identified as a 
COVID-19 patient or transmitter became apparent 
in May during a localised outbreak in the club 
district of Itaewon, popular amongst the LGBTQ+ 
community. People avoided contact tracing efforts 
because of fears of being ‘outed’ and becoming 
the target of public abuse.229 This experience did 
not change the overall crisis narrative of the 
government. The clear exception to the 
homogenising tenor of government narrative is 
recognition of economic class differences in the 
pandemic experience. As the government shifted 
towards economic recovery between mid-April and 
August, particular emphasis was placed on the 
disproportionate suffering experienced by ‘low-
income’ citizens. There is also explicit awareness 
that economically vulnerable populations will have 
more difficulty keeping safe from virus 
transmission (e.g. due to lack of access to masks). 
A citizen campaign to facilitate mask access to 
vulnerable and low-income people, for instance, 
was supported by the government.230 The KCDC 
and Ministry of Health also explicitly recognise the 
psychological distress caused by the pandemic, 
highlighting mental health (‘corona depression’) in 
public messaging.231  
 
Media reports emphasise the infection and deaths 
of medical professionals.232 As in other contexts, 
health workers are implicitly and explicitly framed 
as ‘heroes’ of the pandemic response. The 
government-led #thankstochallenge campaign 
explicitly frames medical professionals —both 
those working in Korea and all other medical 
professionals across the world in the global 
response— as heroes. It is also an attempt to open 
up the discourse on heroization to other ‘ordinary’ 
individuals. 
 
Death Management 
The Ministry of Health maintains up-to-date 
information regarding number of deaths on the 
centralised website on COVID-19 response 
(ncov.mohw.go.kr).233 Fatality numbers on the 
COVID-19 response website are presented 
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alongside more comprehensive information 
regarding the total number of confirmed patients, 
number of tests carried out, and total number of 
‘recovered’ patients (people who have been 
released from quarantine and/or treatment 
following a negative test). On days COVID-19 
related deaths occur, the numbers are also 
reported during daily briefings by the KCDC. They 
are mentioned at the beginning of the press 
conference, contextualised by other statistics such 
as number of confirmed patients, their regional 
breakdown, and patterns of contact that explain 
community transmission.234 The briefings are 
usually led by the KCDC Director, but also by other 
experts within the organisation.  
 
Deaths are reported in a highly individualised 
manner during the briefing. Each report includes 
demographic information about the person, such 
as age, nationality, and gender. This information is 
released in the context of providing further details 
regarding the transmission route, characteristics of 
the virus, and adequacy of the medical response 
(e.g. whether the individual had an underlying 
condition or emergency treatment was efficiently 
deployed). The contextual information also, 
however, has the interesting effect of revealing the 
individual person behind the aggregate statistic, 
potentially humanising the narrative. It also implies 
that there is no set threshold of ‘normalised’ death, 
as each death is treated as a singular event. The 
briefings include explicit recognition of the grief 
experienced by the families and loved ones. At the 
same time, such individualised representation may 
raise privacy concerns, particularly for minoritised 
groups. It could also imply individuals are 
responsible (or even culpable) for contracting the 
virus, thus negatively effecting social cohesion.   
 
The pandemic has resulted in substantial 
disruption to funeral practices. The Ministry of 
Health made cremation mandatory for COVID-19-
related deaths. This is a significant intervention, as 
socially and culturally, cremation is not the 
preferred option for many families. Funerals would 
typically involve three-day wakes with many guests 
in attendance, all of which were strongly 
discouraged by the government which pushed for 
a ‘cremation first, funeral later’ policy without 
wakes or visitors.235 Public rhetoric by key 
members of the CDH have recognised the 
dramatic nature of such interventions by 
emphasising that the policy will still prioritise the 
dignity of the deceased and be carried out with the 
consent of the families.236 They have advertised 
the financial support available for cremation and 
funerals in COVID-19 cases, an intervention lacking 
in many other countries. 237  Despite such public 
assurances of consent-based policies, media 
reports suggest that many families felt they were 
unable to say a ‘proper farewell’ to their loved 
ones.238 This was aggravated by the fact that 
hospital and care home visitations were, in 
principle, barred for COVID-19 patients, although 
exceptions were granted in some cases of 
imminent death.239 This sense of disruption was 
most pronounced during the peak of the pandemic 
in Daegu.240 There is concern in public discourse 
that this may result in legal challenges against the 
government in the coming months, as was the 
case during the MERs outbreak of 2015.241 
‘I am greatly saddened by the fact that 
families are not able to stay by the sides 
of their elders at their death. I 
understand that from the families wish to 
be by their loved ones, and from their 
perspectives [not being with them] will 
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be a lasting emotional wound.’—Jung 
Eun-Kyeong, KCDC Director 1st May 
2020 
Mourning and Commemoration 
There are no explicit central government-led 
commemorative or memorial efforts for those who 
died of COVID-19. Some media reports suggest 
that this lack of commemoration is noted by the 
families, who draw comparisons between public 
commemorative events held for other mass deaths 
events (e.g. the 2014 Sewol Ferry Disaster).242 This 
suggests an absence of commemoration may 
become a point of future social conflict between 
the centralised government narrative of ‘success’ 
in COVID-19 response and the experience of grief 
and suffering by individual citizens. Ad hoc 
commemoration of medical professionals is 
carried out by professional organisations.243 Media 
reports include condolences for victims and 
recognise the grief of families.244   
 
The key government commemorative effort is the 
#thankstochallenge campaign, promoted by the 
CDH on social media. This social media campaign 
enlisted participation of celebrities as well as the 
general public. The core message was 
appreciation for ‘heroes’ of the pandemic, generally 
understood as medical professionals and other key 
workers, but also individual citizens who practiced 
social distancing and other public health 
measures.245  
 
Conclusion 
South Korea experienced the lowest death rate 
thus far amongst the cases examined in this 
project. This, however, did not mean death was an 
insignificant part of COVID-19 narratives. Rather, 
the low death toll contributed to two major 
differences in the South Korean government’s 
approach to talking about death and grief in 
comparison to the UK. Firstly, the South Korean 
discussion of death is significantly more 
individualised and specific in contrast to that of the 
UK, preventing the discussion of death from 
becoming a report of ‘mere statistics.’ It also 
provides additional information about the virus 
itself, including the effects of underlying 
conditions, range of symptoms, and common 
routes of transmission, that can help the broader 
public health effort. Such details provide further 
opportunities for state accountability; it is not 
uncommon to see journalists asking for further 
elaboration on whether all possible public health 
and medical interventions were adequately 
deployed to prevent each individuated death during 
regular press briefings. Relatedly, the South Korean 
messaging does not imply a particular number of 
deaths are an acceptable (‘normalised’) outcome, 
treating each case (or cases in a particular day) as 
a significant event that should be understood, 
grieved, and learned from. This is in stark contrast 
to the UK government messaging, wherein 
changes to death rates are noted, but each death is 
not explicitly marked as a singular event. This 
specified treatment of death is further enabled by 
the fact that, unlike the UK, the state has a division 
of labour between public health messaging and 
communication on other policy interventions. 
Discussions of death and grief are thus managed 
by a consistent entity (the KCDC) and are not 
presented as a trade-off with other forms of loss 
due to COVID-19, such as economic hardships.  
 
Secondly, the low death rate, alongside relative 
success in quickly ‘flattening’ the first wave, 
allowed the South Korean government to advance 
a narrative of success in its COVID-19 response. 
This narrative is augmented by the fact that the 
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CDH publishes virus recovery rates alongside 
confirmed infection and death rates. Two 
comparative lessons can be drawn from this. First 
is a cautionary tale—even with significantly lower 
death rates than the UK, the overarching narrative 
of success sits uneasily alongside the individual 
grief and challenges felt by ordinary citizens, 
potentially negatively impacting social order. With 
the recent increase in transmission rates (officially 
denoted as the ‘second wave’, accompanied by an 
increase in partial lockdowns and social distancing 
measures), it remains to be seen whether the 
narrative of success will contribute to greater 
social solidarity in longer-term interventions or 
produce social fatigue and disillusionment with the 
government. Second, South Korea’s narrative of 
success exists in the context of public experiences 
of past, recent regional epidemics, and a 
corresponding embrace of the necessity of 
multilateral public health cooperation. This is 
undoubtedly a strategic move by the government, 
attempting to leverage its COVID-19 response as a 
form of ‘soft power’ internationally. That said, 
South Korea’s emphasis on cooperation with the 
WHO and aid to other countries as part of its 
‘success’ narrative is notable in an era marked by 
nationalistic competition, including COVID-19 
responses. This type of messaging may be 
reasonably speculated to result in a different, more 
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Germany  
Katharina Kuhn 
‘No, this pandemic is not a war. Nations 
are not standing against nations, 
soldiers not against soldiers. But it is a 
test of our humanity. It elicits the worst 
and the best in humans. Let's show each 
other the best in us!’ —Frank Walter 
Steinmeier, President of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 11 April 2020  
Background  
As of 31 July 2020, Germany has seen a total of 
208,698 cases and 9,141 deaths.246 The first case 
of COVID-19 was reported on 28 January 2020.247 
Until the end of February, new cases were isolated 
and not met with community-wide measures. 
COVID-19 was not considered a health risk until 17 
March, when the Robert Koch Institute (RKI), a 
federal government agency responsible for public 
health, disease control and prevention, changed 
the risk assessment to ‘high’.248 The daily number 
of new cases peaked between the end of March 
and the first week of April and began to decline.249 
The highest number of new infections per day was 
reached on 28 March, with a total of 6,294 new 
cases; the highest number of deaths reported in 
one day was 315 on 16 April.250  
 
The RKI held its first press briefing on 27 February 
and continued doing so on a daily basis until 07 
May.251 The first politician-led COVID-19 specific 
press conference occurred on 11 March, led by 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, health minister Jens 
Spahn, and the head of the RKI Lothar Wieler.252 A 
comprehensive lockdown was first issued in 
Bavaria on 20 March 2020253 with other states 
following from 22 March.254 The lockdown 
restrictions were gradually eased from 20 April 
2020 onwards, according to the severity of the 
respective local situation in each state.255 On 6 
May, Merkel and state leaders agreed to a 
threshold of 50 new infections per 100,000 
inhabitants within seven days on a district level, at 
which time district authorities impose lockdown 
measures and regulations.256 This regulation was 
first implemented on 23 June, in Gütersloh and 
Warendorf.257   
 
Crisis Narrative  
During the pandemic, a special relationship 
evolved between political actors and scientists. 
The communication of relevant facts about the 
pandemic, including death figures, was the 
responsibility of the RKI. Starting on 4 March, the 
RKI published daily status reports on its websites 
and held daily press briefings that were 
broadcasted on TV and radio. Political actors at 
the federal and state level, in contrast, held press 
conferences only in order to communicate political 
measures (such as contact restrictions or the 
closure of schools), but not to inform the public 
about the pandemic as such. Press conferences at 
the federal level were held by Chancellor Merkel 
together with the minister presidents of Bavaria 
and Hamburg, as well as the Vice Chancellor, 
initially once and twice a week and every fortnight 
after 6 May. During some of the press conferences 
politicians conveyed their sympathy with the 
deceased.258  
 
Death played a minor role in the overall German 
COVID-19 discourse (though it was more 
prominent in mainstream media than government 
communication). This relative absence of death in 
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the German context created the perception that 
death ‘happens somewhere else’. Mainstream 
media closely followed the situation in the most 
affected countries (such as Italy, Brazil, and the 
US). Politicians regularly conveyed their 
sympathies with Italy and France. President 
Steinmeier stated in a TV address: ‘Many 
thousands have died. Here in our own country. And 
in Bergamo, in the Elsass, in Madrid, New York and 
in many other places in the world.’259 Linking 
COVID-19 deaths in Germany to the suffering 
elsewhere underlined the severity and tragedy of 
the pandemic. 
 
This outward focus of pandemic discourse reflects 
a general perception that, compared to elsewhere, 
Germany and the German health system ‘did well’. 
Newspapers appreciated Chancellor Merkel’s 
unagitated and matter-of-factly communication 
style and proudly reported about positive 
comments on her crisis management from 
abroad.260 The perception that Germany ‘did well’ 
was integrated into a broader narrative that has 
shaped German national identity since 2016, 
framing Germany (and Merkel in particular) as the 
last ‘leader of the free world’.261 
 
Instead of death tolls or numbers of new cases, the 
most important reference point to describe the 
pandemic was the so-called R-value, which refers 
to the approximate number one COVID-19 positive 
patient infects on average.262 The R-value was part 
of media debates and well known by the public. 
Merkel and other politicians stressed that a 
normalisation of everyday life was not possible 
until the R-value was below one for several days.263 
The COVID-19 pandemic was considered under 
control on May, when the R-value had been below 
one for three subsequent weeks.264 The daily 
number of deaths at this time was around 100.265 
Though this might be taken as an indicator of 
implicitly ‘acceptable’ death rates, it is important to 
note that this phase was not framed to the public 
as ‘back to normal’. Lockdown and social 
distancing restrictions remained in place until the 
beginning of June (in some states even longer).266 
Daily deaths at this time, likely a better indicator of 
normalisation, oscillated between 10 and 30, 
similar to the Italian and UK cases.267  
 
The term most frequently used to refer to the 
pandemic in media and political discourses was 
‘crisis’ or ‘COVID-19 crisis’ (Krise), followed by 
‘fight’ (Kampf). The terms highlight different 
strands of the pandemic crisis narrative: By talking 
of the COVID-19 pandemic as a ‘crisis’, the media 
linked the COVID-19 pandemic to the 2008 
Financial Crisis.268 This comparison centred on: a) 
Merkel’s reputation as ‘Crisis Chancellor’; and b) 
the economic relief package adopted by the 
Bundestag on 25 March. The comparison to the 
Financial Crisis framed the pandemic as a long-
lasting, systemic problem (Merkel referred to the 
COVID-19 pandemic as a ‘marathon’)269 that needs 
to be managed and simultaneously drew attention 
to the expected economic ramifications and their 
overcoming.270 This framing contributed to de-
centring death as a theme in the public discourse.  
 
At the same time, the term ‘fight’ (Kampf) was 
used to undermine the importance of ‘closing 
ranks’ as a society and using combined efforts to 
counter the threat of the virus. The term ‘fight’ 
(Kampf) was used less with the connotation of a 
‘battle’ than in the sense of ‘strong efforts’ and 
appeared together with terms such as ‘test’ 
(Prüfung)271 or ‘challenge’ (Herausforderung).272 
This overall framing of the pandemic as a ‘stress 
test’ (Bewährungsprobe)273 that society as a whole 
has to ‘pass’ (bestehen)274 emphasized solidarity 
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and mutual support as appropriate remedies and 
appealed to the collective efforts of each 
individual.275   
 
Since the beginning of the pandemic, one of the 
defining features of official discourse was an 
insistence that every death is tragic and should be 
avoided by all means. Merkel, for instance, stated 
on 18 March that deaths are ‘not only abstract 
numbers in a statistic, but it is a father or a 
grandfather, a mother or a grandmother, a partner 
– it is humans’.276 Politicians at all levels of 
government opposed any form of normalisation of 
death by stressing that ‘we are a community in 
which every life and every human counts’277. They 
did not distinguish between different groups in 
their condolences. Similarly, official statements 
made it clear that pandemic management was not 
a question of health or the economy, but both had 
to be protected and supported simultaneously.278 
The Minister President of Bavaria, for instance, 
stressed that ‘[w]e want to sustain as much 
economic activity as possible. But everything that 
could endanger humans, everything that could 
harm the individual or our community, is what we 
now need to reduce’.279  
 
That said, the protection of the elderly, who made 
up more than 85% of deaths, was a special 
concern.280 The media referred to the elderly as ‘the 
weakest’281 and called for society to ‘protect the 
grandparents’282. Politicians stressed that it was 
intolerable to accept high risks for the elderly and 
people with underlying health conditions, even if 
this meant damage to the economy.283 In the same 
vein, the mainstream media highlighted 
extraordinarily tragic deaths, such as those of 34 
elderly people died in two residential care homes in 
Würzburg or a pregnant woman.284 In addition, both 
politicians and media emphasized the 
responsibility of younger and healthier members of 
society for the elderly and risk groups. Even though 
politicians otherwise tried to prevent a 
hierarchization of grief by stressing the 
momentousness of each individual death, the 
portrayal of vulnerable persons as in special need 
of protection nevertheless created an implicit 
hierarchy of tragedy. This subtle hierarchicalisation 
interestingly reverses that seen in the UK, as 
vulnerability informed the tragedy of a case. Based 
on the framing of the pandemic as a ‘stress test’ 
(Bewährungsprobe)285 for societal solidarity, the 
death of a vulnerable person is framed as a failure 
of society’s responsibility to protect them.286 
 
Attention to the differential needs and 
vulnerabilities of religious and minoritised ethnic 
communities was relatively low. Religious 
communities actively supported the lockdown 
measures during the first weeks of the pandemic, 
but called for an easing of restrictions from May 
onwards.287 While political actors sought dialogue 
with religious communities, non-mainstream 
religious groups, such as Pentecostal, Baptist, and 
Muslim communities, were occasionally blamed in 
the media for new outbreaks.288 Though the full 
social and political effects of these discourses – 
and failure to explicitly incorporate different 
communities into official COVID-19 narratives – 
remains to be seen, it appears that, as in other 
cases, the pandemic reflects and reinforces 
existing social divisions, with potentially negative 
consequences for social order and solidarity. 
 
Death Management  
COVID-19 related statistics are compiled by the RKI 
and published in daily briefs (Situationsberichte) on 
its webpage. The statistics are based on data that 
is reported to, and collected by, local health 
authorities and transmitted to the RKI by the 
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respective responsible state-level health 
authority.289 The RKI as well as other virologists 
enjoyed great levels of trust during the pandemic; 
the data collected and presented by the RKI was 
received as trustworthy and reliable by media, 
politicians, and the public alike. 
 
Demographically, more than 85% of deaths were of 
people over 70 years old; the median age of 
COVID-19 related deaths is 82.290 55% of all deaths 
were men. 291 About a third of all deaths occurred 
among residents of care homes, underlining the 
heightened vulnerability of elderly patients. 292 
There are no statistics on the ethnic background of 
COVID-19 related deaths. 
 
To protect vulnerable groups, access restrictions 
to care homes were implemented on 16 March; 
hospitals and care home visits were completely 
forbidden between 16 March and 9 May.293 The 
German Foundation for Patients’ Rights (GFR; 
Deutsche Stiftung Patientenschutz) criticized this 
step. They argued that many patients and care 
home residents suffered isolation and loneliness 
due to these restrictions, which they called 
‘organised deprivation of liberty’ (organisierte 
Freiheitsberaubung).294 Some families and media 
commentary argued that the access restrictions 
had ‘killed’ (getötet) care home residents295 and, 
together with the GFR, called for a more ‘human’ 
(menschlich) approach.296 Since 9 May, each 
patient or care home resident is allowed to receive 
one visitor for up to one hour per day.297  
 
There were no (new) specific regulations 
concerning the disposal and management of 
deceased bodies. On 16 March, funeral attendance 
was limited to close family members only.298 
Singing was not allowed, which led to very short 
funerals that family members perceived as 
unsatisfactory in assisting them to process 
grief.299 Funeral restrictions interrupted important 
traditions of grief such as having dinner with 
friends and family after the funeral (‘funeral feast’). 
Muslim and Jewish communities were affected 
particularly strongly due to the disruption of 
appropriate/typical mourning and care for bodies. 
The lack of collective mourning and grief 
distressed many bereaved people across religious 
communities; relatives of the deceased questioned 
the proportionality of the measures.300 By March 
different stakeholders, including a politician and 
members of the Protestant church, recommended 
to plan additional memorial services after the 
pandemic to support the mourning process.301 
 
That said, funeral restrictions were generally 
followed.302 From May onwards, religious 
communities’ calls for an easing of these 
restrictions, as well as restrictions on religious 
services in general, grew louder.303 In parallel to 
their growing contestation, breaches of the 
restrictions increased.304 Funeral restrictions were 
eased when social distancing regulations in each 
state were lifted (starting from 3 May 2020).305  
 
Mourning and Commemoration  
Since the beginning of the pandemic, health 
workers and workers in jobs of ‘systemic 
relevance’ –  such as cleaners, delivery workers, 
and shop assistants – received heightened 
attention in mainstream media. Political 
stakeholders to thanked 'system-relevant’ workers 
and health and care workers for their efforts.306 
Discussions emphasized their working conditions 
and low income. The term ‘systemic relevance’ 
was initially coined during the 2008 Financial Crisis 
to describe banks so large their bailout was 
essential to the economic and financial system. 
The transfer of the term ‘system relevant’ to 
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COVID-19 not only linked the pandemic to the 
Financial Crisis, but also implicitly questioned 
societal priorities and hierarchies. According to the 
emerging narrative, it is no longer banks and 
businesses (‘at the top’) that should be bailed out, 
but those whose work is often financially and 
socially de-valorised. While the narrative of ‘system 
relevant workers’ has the potential to reforge a 
more inclusive capitalism post-COVID, there is a 
risk that symbolic compensatory activities such as 
clapping or giving small gifts will conceal the 
systemic origins and potential solutions to socio-
economic inequalities. This criticism was 
expressed by some ‘system relevant’ workers, who 
argued that ‘more sustainable measures’ than 
clapping or chocolates were really required.307  
 
Interestingly, the deaths of members of health and 
‘system-relevant’ workers received comparatively 
little attention. The deaths of ‘system relevant’ 
workers did not feature in mainstream media at all 
and were also not addressed by political 
stakeholders. The deaths and infection of health 
and medical professionals received slightly more 
attention. The media criticised the lack of data 
about infections and deaths among health and 
care workers308 and reported their heightened risk 
of infection due to a lack of adequate PPE. These 
reports, however, were framed as warnings and 
stressed that a lack of political action on this issue 
could lead to deaths in the future, rather than 
commemorating deaths that had already 
occurred.309  
There was very little heroization of health or 
system relevant workers in mainstream media or 
by politicians. News articles in national media 
reported on deaths of health and care workers 
matter-of-factly and did not feature pictures of 
 
iii Data on the professional occupation of COVID-19 patients is 
not reported in about 25% of all cases. 
deceased workers or their biographies. 310 There 
was no official, nation-wide commemoration of the 
death of medical and care staff, and political 
stakeholders did not convey condolences to their 
families specifically.  
 
This lack of commemoration may be partly due to 
the structure of the German health system, which 
is perceived as a less coherent, unitary entity and 
much less entangled with the state than the NHS in 
the UK. The German health system is less strongly 
associated with national identity than in other 
cases (such as the UK and South Korea). Another 
reason may be the comparatively low number of 
overall deaths of health and care workers related 
to COVID-19. As of 28 July, 62 health workers had 
died, of which 22 worked directly in health 
institutions such as hospitals or surgeries and 40 
in ‘care institutions’, ranging from care homes to 
doss houses and prisons.311 There is no data on 
deaths of workers in non-health related system-
relevant jobs. iii   
 
Despite the interruption of private funeral, 
commemorative, and mourning practices, very little 
commemoration has taken place. Some 
commemorative practices are apparent in local 
(secular or religious) contexts. For instance, a 
woman put up grave candles for every victim of 
COVID-19 in her garden;312 a local shooting club 
fired gun salutes during a celebration of the 
Catholic festival of Corpus Christi.313 The only 
nation-wide form of commemoration so far  took 
place in the context of various football leagues, 
where, similar to other tragedies, players held 
minute’s silences before starting their matches 
and appeared in crepe.314 There was no list of all 
victims of the pandemic or other forms of 
Confronting the COVID-19 Pandemic          49  
commemoration in the mainstream media, as 
newspapers elsewhere produced.315  
 
The lack (so far) of government-led 
commemoration is exceptional insofar as recent 
terrorist attacks were commemorated with a 
memorial service attended by high-ranking 
politicians316 and memorial established by the city 
council.317 This approach to memorial culture has 
been criticized as too ‘pragmatic’ and reflecting a 
premature insistence on a ‘return to normal’ 
narrative by Merkel.318 A (very) recent 5 September 
proposal for national commemoration has to be 
seen in this context. President Steinmeier 
suggested a state memorial in commemoration of 
the victims of the pandemic, which was well 
received by politicians, the media and the public, 
but has not been followed by state-level proposals.  
‘These are not only abstract numbers in 
a statistic, but a father or a grandfather, 
a mother or a grandmother, a partner, 
these are humans. And we are a 
community in which every life and every 
human counts.’—Angela Merkel, 
Chancellor of Germany,18 March 2020 
Conclusion  
The framing of the pandemic as both a crisis and a 
fight placed the responsibility for overcoming the 
virus on the individual, community-oriented 
behaviour of each person. In line with this framing, 
there was a strong sense of cohesion during the 
first weeks of the pandemic. The mainstream 
 
iv The two largest protests took place in Berlin on 01 August 
2020 and 29 August 2020, with more than 20,000 participants 
on 01 August and almost 40,000 protesters on 29 August. 
media supported lockdown measures and  citizens 
largely adhered to the regulations.319 The emphasis 
on health workers and other ‘system relevant’ jobs 
created a narrative that valorise  the commitment 
and work of each individual ‘man in the street’ and 
praised everyday acts of solidarity.320  
 
This sense of social cohesion showed signs of 
fracture when what had been growing discursive 
contestations of lockdown regulations since May 
became demonstrations.321iv Protesters called the 
lockdown measures ‘unreasonable’ and 
‘undemocratic’ and trivialized the virus and its 
lethality.322 The continuing protests also 
disseminate conspiracy theories, anti-Semitism, 
racism, and other exclusionary ideologies currently 
proliferating within German society. 323 This 
suggests that, similar to COVID-19’s perpetuation 
of existing vulnerabilities and inequalities, the anti-
lockdown protests are also informed and animated 
by pre-existing political grievances and cleavages. 
German social order is therefore in the process of 
being shaped by COVID-19, but in a somewhat 
ambiguous manner, as it intensifies existing 
cleavages while also promoting some forms of 
solidarity. 
 
Three central factors distinguish the Germany case 
from the UK. First, death was framed as ‘tragic’ and 
‘avoidable’ by political stakeholders but was at the 
same time strikingly absent from the official and 
media discourse. Whereas death was routinely 
mentioned in UK press briefings as (one of several) 
inevitable consequences of the COVID-19 
pandemic, political actors in Germany only rarely 
mentioned deaths, and if so, did this only in order 
to convey their condolences and to communicate 
the tragedy and social and emotional 
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momentousness of deaths. The infrequency with 
which death was mentioned by political 
stakeholders, interestingly, prevented its 
normalisation, further supporting the narrative that 
‘every life and every human counts’.324 The 
separation of communicative responsibility 
between the RKI and political actors also 
underlined the extraordinariness of death, as it 
separated technical details related to death (such 
as death tolls and infection rates) from the 
communication of sympathy and condolences by 
political actors. 
 
The second and perhaps most striking difference 
relates to German politicians’ eschewing of ‘war’ 
frames. Instead, the crisis was framed much more 
as a challenge for society as well as ‘technical’ 
issue that needs to be managed, similar to other 
crises in the past – particularly the Financial Crisis 
of 2008. This framing de-centred death as a theme 
in the public discourse, while emphasizing both 
economic aspects of the pandemic and its 
manageability. While there is a risk that such a 
framing contributes to downplaying the 
momentousness of death that occurred due to the 
pandemic, the simultaneous emphasis on the 
tragedy of death prevented such a dynamic. 
 
Third, in contrast to the UK, commemoration plays 
only a minor role in the public discourse. While 
health and other ‘system relevant’ workers were 
praised by politicians and mainstream media in 
both countries, this did not lead to official 
commemorations of their efforts or deaths in 
Germany. In contrast to the UK, commemoration 
was limited to very few local instances, and there 
were no calls for commemoration by the wider 
public. The sole exception to this is President’s 
Steinmeier’s recent call for an ‘act of state’ to 
commemorate COVID-19 loss. While this proposal 
was well received by politicians, the media and the 
public, its top-down nature differentiates it from 
the UK, where commemoration emerged within 
affected communities. Although official state 
commemoration may serve an important role in 
recognising the grief and experiences of those who 
lost friends and family, there is a risk that a lack of 
community ownership will deplete its meaning for 
some parts of society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Confronting the COVID-19 Pandemic          51  
 
 
 
246 "COVID-19: Fallzahlen in Deutschland und weltweit, 31 Juli 
2020’, Robert Koch Institute (31.07.2020) 
https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavir
us/Fallzahlen.html.  
247 ‘Erster Coronavirus-Fall in Deutschland bestätigt’, 
Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland (28.01.2020) 
https://www.rnd.de/panorama/erster-coronavirus-fall-in-
deutschland-bestatigt-
OJ3I4R3VGNCQBAWOJT3UVMSUQM.html. 
248 "Robert Koch-Institute stuft Gesundheitsrisiko für 
Deutschland jetzt als hoch ein’, Spiegel Wissenschaft 
(17.03.2020) 
https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/medizin/coronavirus-rki-
aendert-einschaetzung-des-gesundheitsrisikos-in-deutschland-
auf-hoch-a-55a7b2fc-68cd-4aae-a7c3-9cc129bbaee8. 
249 "Aktuelle Zahlen und Entwicklungen’, Deutschlandfunk 
(30.07.2020) https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/coronavirus-
aktuelle-zahlen-und-
entwicklungen.2897.de.html?dram:article_id=472799.  
250 "Aktueller Lage-/Situationsbericht des RKI zu COVID-10, 22 
August 2020’, Robert Koch Institute (22.08.2020) 
https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavir
us/Situationsberichte/Gesamt.html?nn=13490888. 
251 "Wir müssen Zeit gewinnen’, tagesschau.de (27.02.2020) 
https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/coronavirus-deutschland-
135.html; ‘Raus aus dem Rampenlicht’, tagesschau.de 
(07.05.2020) https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/rki-briefing-
corona-101.html.   
252 "Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel, 
Bundesgesundheitsminister Spahn und RKI-Chef Wieler’, 
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (11.03.2020) 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
de/suche/pressekonferenz-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-
bundesgesundheitsminister-spahn-und-rki-chef-wieler-1729940. 
253 "Veröffentlichung BayMBI. 2020 Nr. 152 vom 25.03.2020’, 
Bayern.Recht (25.03.2020) https://www.verkuendung-
bayern.de/baymbl/2020-152/. 
254 "Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zu der 
Besprechung mit den Regierungschefinnen und 
Regierungschefs der Länder zum Coronavirus’, Presse- und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (22.03.2020) 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
de/suche/pressekonferenz-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-zu-der-
besprechung-mit-den-regierungschefinnen-und-
regierungschefs-der-laender-zum-coronavirus-1733286.  
255 "Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel’, Presse- und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (20.04.2020) 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
de/suche/pressekonferenz-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-
1745362.  
256 "Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel, 
Ministerpräsident Söder und dem Ersten Bürgermeister 
Tschentscher im Anschluss an das Gespräch mit den 
Regierungschefinnen und Regierungschefs der Länder’, Presse- 
und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (06.05.2020) 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
de/suche/pressekonferenz-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-
ministerpraesident-soeder-und-dem-ersten-buergermeister-
tschentscher-im-anschluss-an-das-gespraech-mit-den-
regierungschefinnen-und-regierungschefs-der-laender-1751050. 
 
257 "Hunderte Neuinfizierte in Fleischfabrik’, Spiegel Online 
(17.06.2020); "Mehr als 1000 Tönnies-Mitarbeiter positiv auf 
Corona getestet’, Spiegel Online (20.06.2020). 
258 "Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel, 
Bundesminister Scholz, Ministerpräsident Söder und dem 
Ersten Bürgermeister Tschentscher im Anschluss an das 
Gespräch mit den Regierungschefinnen und Regierungschefs 
der Länder’, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung 
(15.04.2020) https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
de/suche/pressekonferenz-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-
bundesminister-scholz-ministerpraesident-soeder-und-dem-
ersten-buergermeister-tschentscher-im-anschluss-an-das-
gespraech-mit-den-regierungschefinnen-und-regierungschefs-
der-laender-1744310; ‘Fernsehansprache von Bundespräsident 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier zur Corona-Pandemie am 11. April 
2020 in Schloss Bellevue’, Bundespräsidialamt (11.04.2020) 
https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Fran
k-Walter-Steinmeier/Reden/2020/04/200411-TV-Ansprache-
Corona-Ostern.html.              
259 ‘Viele Tausend sind gestorben. Bei uns im eigenen Land. 
Und in Bergamo, im Elsass, in Madrid, New York, und vielen 
anderen Orten auf der Welt.’; source: "Fernsehansprache von 
Bundespräsident Frank-Walter Steinmeier zur Corona-Pandemie 
am 11. April 2020 in Schloss Bellevue’, Bundespräsidialamt 
(11.04.2020) 
https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Fran
k-Walter-Steinmeier/Reden/2020/04/200411-TV-Ansprache-
Corona-Ostern.html. 
260 "Corona: Die Welt schaut auf Merkel’, Deutsche Welle 
(24.04.2020), https://www.dw.com/de/corona-die-welt-schaut-
auf-merkel/a-53230843; "Merkel, die Krisenkanzlerin?’, 
tagesschau.de (23.04.2020), 
https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/merkel-coronavirus-krise-
101.html; "Krisen kann sie’, ZEIT Online (19.04.2020), 
https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2020-04/angela-
merkel-coronavirus-krisenpolitik-donald-trump.  
261 "Anführerin der freien Wlt? Aber klar doch!’, ZEIT Online 
(21.11.2016), https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-
11/angela-merkel-kandidatur-anfuehrerin-freie-
welt/komplettansicht; "Die Anführerin der freien Welt – und ihr 
Programm’, Süddeutsche Zeitung Online (20.11.2016), 
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/angela-merkel-die-
anfuehrerin-der-freien-welt-und-ihr-programm-1.3257286; "Offen 
gegen Trump – Berlin will die Weltordnung retten’, Reuters 
(03.06.2018), https://jp.reuters.com/article/usa-deutschland-
idDEKCN1IZ0KD.    
262 "Antworten auf häufig gestellte Fragen zum Coronavirus 
SARS-CoV-2 / Krankheit COVID-19", Robert Koch Institute 
(07.08.2020) 
https://www.rki.de/SharedDocs/FAQ/NCOV2019/gesamt.html.  
263 "Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel’, Presse- und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (20.04.2020) 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
de/suche/pressekonferenz-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-
1745362.  
264 "Raus aus dem Rampenlicht’, tagesschau.de (07.05.2020) 
https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/rki-briefing-corona-
101.html. 
265 "Aktueller Lage-/Situationsbericht des RKI zu COVID-10, 22 
August 2020’, Robert Koch Institute (22.08.2020) 
https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavir
us/Situationsberichte/Gesamt.html?nn=13490888. 
52          Confronting the COVID-19 Pandemic  
 
266 "Bericht aus der Kabinettssitzung vom 16. Juni 2020’, 
Bayerische Staatsregierung (16.06.2020) 
https://www.bayern.de/bericht-aus-der-kabinettssitzung-vom-
16-juni-2020/.  
267 "Aktueller Lage-/Situationsbericht des RKI zu COVID-10, 22 
August 2020’, Robert Koch Institute (22.08.2020) 
https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavir
us/Situationsberichte/Gesamt.html?nn=13490888. 
268 ‘Merkel ist nicht schwach, sondern realistisch’, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung Online (11.03.2020).   
269 "Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel, 
Ministerpräsident Söder und dem Ersten Bürgermeister 
Tschentscher im Anschluss an das Gespräch mit den 
Regierungschefinnen und Regierungschefs der Länder’, Presse- 
und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (30 April 2020) 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
de/suche/pressekonferenz-von-bundeskanzlerin-merkel-
ministerpraesident-soeder-und-dem-ersten-buergermeister-
tschentscher-im-anschluss-an-das-gespraech-mit-den-
regierungschefinnen-und-regierungschefs-der-laender-1749850. 
270 "Bitte ganz ruhig; Jens Spahn muss sich als Krisenmanager 
noch beweisen’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (27.02.2020).         
271 "Wir gehen davon aus, dass es ein Stresstest wird für unser 
Land", Spiegel Online (13.03.2020).   
272 ‘Fernsehansprache von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel’, 
tagesschau.de (18.03.2020) 
https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video-
676493.html. 
273 "Bayern schließt alle Schulen und Kitas für fünf Wochen’, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung Online (13.03.2020); "Nordrhein-Westfalen 
untersagt Besuche in Alten- und Pflegeheimen’, Spiegel Online 
(13.03.2020).     
274 ‘Fernsehansprache von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel’, 
tagesschau.de (18.03.2020) 
https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video-
676493.html. 
275 ‘Fernsehansprache von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel’, 
tagesschau.de (18.03.2020) 
https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video-
676493.html; ‘Fernsehansprache von Bundespräsident Frank-
Walter Steinmeier zur Corona-Pandemie am 11. April 2020 in 
Schloss Bellevue’, Bundespräsidialamt (11.04.2020) 
https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Fran
k-Walter-Steinmeier/Reden/2020/04/200411-TV-Ansprache-
Corona-Ostern.html; "Pandemie-Status ändert nichts an 
Vorkehrungen in Deutschland’, Spiegel Online (12.03.2020); 
"Corona heißt auch, daran zu denken, wie es anderen geht’, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung Online (14.03.2020).           
276 "Das sind nicht einfach abstrakte Zahlen in einer Statistik, 
sondern das ist ein Vater oder Großvater, eine Mutter oder 
Großmutter, eine Partnerin oder Partner - es sind Menschen."; 
source: ‘Fernsehansprache von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel’, 
tagesschau.de (18.03.2020) 
https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video-
676493.html.   
277 "wir sind eine Gemeinschaft, in der jedes Leben und jeder 
Mensch zählt’; source: ‘Fernsehansprache von Bundeskanzlerin 
Merkel’, tagesschau.de (18.03.2020) 
https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video-
676493.html.       
278 ‘Fernsehansprache von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel’, 
tagesschau.de (18.03.2020) 
https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video-
676493.html; "Osteransprache des Bayerischen 
Ministerpräsidenten Dr. Markus Söder’, Bayerische 
Staatsregierung (11.04.2020) 
https://www.bayern.de/osteransprache-des-bayerischen-
ministerpraesidenten-dr-markus-soeder/?seite=28408; "Bericht 
aus der Kabinettssitzung vom 17. März 2020’, Bayerische 
Staatsregierung (17.03.2020) https://www.bayern.de/bericht-
aus-der-kabinettssitzung-vom-17-maerz-2020/?seite=28408. 
279 "Osteransprache des Bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten Dr. 
Markus Söder’, Bayerische Staatsregierung (11.04.2020) 
https://www.bayern.de/osteransprache-des-bayerischen-
ministerpraesidenten-dr-markus-soeder/?seite=28408.     
280 ‘SARS-CoV-2 Steckbrief zur Coronairus-Krankheit-2019 
(COVID-19)’, Robert Koch Institute (24.07.2020). 
https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavir
us/Steckbrief.html#doc13776792bodyText4. 
281 "die Schwächsten’; source: "Wenn Corona die Schwächsten 
trifft’, Spiegel Online (26.03.2020).  
282 "Schützt die Großeltern!"; source: "Schützt die Großeltern!’, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung Online (11.03.2020).  
283 "Seehofer gegen zu schnelles Lockern der 
Ausgangsbeschränkungen’, Süddeutsche Zeitung Online 
(26.03.2020).   
284 "Schon 24 Corona-Tote in Pflegeheim’, BILD (17.04.2020), 
p.5; "Corona-Drama um hochschwangere Bayerin - Ärzte können 
nur ihr Kind retten’, Merkur (11.05.2020) 
https://www.merkur.de/bayern/corona-baby-weiherhammer-
bayern-schwangerschaft-oberpfalz-unternehmerin-tot-zr-
13664152.html. 
285 "Bayern schließt alle Schulen und Kitas für fünf Wochen’, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung Online (13.03.2020); "Nordrhein-Westfalen 
untersagt Besuche in Alten- und Pflegeheimen’, Spiegel Online 
(13.03.2020).     
286 "Wie schütze ich meine Freunde?’, Spiegel Online 
(02.03.2020); "Schützt die Großeltern!’, Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Online (11.03.2020); "Die Verwundbarsten’, Süddeutsche Zeitung 
(14.03.2020), p.1; "Corona heißt auch, daran zu denken, wie es 
anderen geht’, Süddeutsche Zeitung Online (14.03.2020).           
287 "Wie Christen, Muslime und Juden auf das 
Gottesdienstverbot reagieren’, Spiegel Online (19.03.2020); 
"Abendmahl vor dem Bildschirm’, ZEIT Online (22.03.2020); 
"Geistlich vereint’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (21.03.2020); 
"Abendmahl vor dem Bildschirm’; ZEIT Online (22.03.2020); 
"Kirchen rechnen mit Gottesdiensten ab Mai’, ZEIT Online 
(17.04.2020); "Ausnahmen vom Gottesdienst-Verbot müssen 
möglich sein’, Spiegel Online (29.04.2020).                   
288 "Voller als im Dom’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (27.05.2020), p.5; 
"44 Infizierte nach Gottesdienst in Bremerhaven’, ZEIT Online 
(29.05.2020); "Nach Zuckerfest in Göttingen: Weitere Corona-
Infektionen’, zdf heute (02.06.2020) 
https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/zuckerfest-goettingen-
corona-infektionen-100.html. 
289 "COVID-19: Fallzahlen in Deutschland und weltweit, 31 Juli 
2020’, Robert Koch Institute (31.07.2020) 
https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavir
us/Fallzahlen.html. 
290 "COVID-19: Fallzahlen in Deutschland und weltweit, 31 Juli 
2020’, Robert Koch Institute (31.07.2020) 
https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavir
us/Fallzahlen.html. 
291 "COVID-19: Fallzahlen in Deutschland und weltweit, 31 Juli 
2020’, Robert Koch Institute (31.07.2020) 
https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavir
us/Fallzahlen.html. 
292 "COVID-19: Fallzahlen in Deutschland und weltweit, 31 Juli 
2020’, Robert Koch Institute (31.07.2020) 
https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavir
us/Fallzahlen.html. 
Confronting the COVID-19 Pandemic          53  
 
293 "Aufnahmestopp in Pflegeheimen alarmiert 
Patientenschützer’, Süddeutsche Zeitung Online (02.04.2020) 
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/gesundheit/gesundheit-
dortmund-aufnahmestopp-in-pflegeheimen-alarmiert-
patientenschuetzer-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-
200402-99-566343. 
294 "Huml für Lockerung von Besuchsverbot für Altenheime’, 
BR24 (01.05.2020) 
https://www.br.de/nachrichten/bayern/huml-will-
besuchsverbot-fuer-altenheime-lockern,RxkHYH2. 
295 "KRITIK an radikalen Corona-Maßnahmen wird lauter +++ 
Familie klagt wegen BESUCHSVERBOT im Altenheim", BILD 
(16.05.2020), p.3.    
296 "Patientenschützer kritisieren ‚Freiheitsberaubung‘ in 
Pflegeheimen’, ZEIT Online (30.05.2020). 
297 "Bericht aus der Kabinettssitzung vom 16.04.2020’, 
Bayerische Staatsregierung (16.04.2020) 
https://www.bayern.de/bericht-aus-der-kabinettssitzung-vom-
16-april-2020/?seite=28408; "Bericht aus der Kabinettssitzung 
vom 5. Mai 2020’, Bayerische Staatsregierung (05.05.2020) 
https://www.bayern.de/bericht-aus-der-kabinettssitzung-vom-5-
mai-2020/?seite=28408. 
298 "Vereinbarung zwischen der Bundesregierung und den 
Regierungschefinnen und Regierungschefs der Bundesländer 
angesichts der Corona-Epidemie in Deutschland’, Presse- und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung 
(16.03.2020)https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
de/suche/vereinbarung-zwischen-der-bundesregierung-und-
den-regierungschefinnen-und-regierungschefs-der-
bundeslaender-angesichts-der-corona-epidemie-in-deutschland-
1730934. 
299 "Das Schlimmste war der Gedanke, dass sie ganz allein 
gestorben ist’, ZEIT Online (10.07.2020), 
https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/familie/2020-07/trauer-
corona-isolation-kontaktbeschraenkung-verlust-abschied;   
300 "Abschied mit Corona-Abstand: Beerdigungen mit beliebig 
vielen Trauernden wieder möglich’, Fuldaer Zeitungn 
(16.09.2020) https://www.fuldaerzeitung.de/fulda/beerdigung-
coronavirus-abschied-abstand-trauer-fulda-familie-bastian-
kummer-bestattung-90011242.html. 
301 "Corona-Auflagen: Kommunen kontrollieren bei 
Beerdigungen’, Die Rheinpfalz (05.04.2020), 
https://www.rheinpfalz.de/pfalz_artikel,-corona-auflagen-
kommunen-kontrollieren-bei-beerdigungen-_arid,5052016.html; 
"‘Hart aber fair‘ zum Coronavirus; ‚Wir werden uns irren‘"; 
Süddeutsche Zeitung Online (17.03.2020); "Neue Regeln bei 
Beerdigungen; NICHT MEHR ALS 25 TRAUERGÄSTE’; BILD 
(18.03.2020), p.4;  "Die Einsamkeit am Grab’; Süddeutsche 
Zeitung (22.04.2020), p.6. 
302 "Corona-Auflagen: Kommunen kontrollieren bei 
Beerdigungen’, Die Rheinpfalz (05.04.2020), 
https://www.rheinpfalz.de/pfalz_artikel,-corona-auflagen-
kommunen-kontrollieren-bei-beerdigungen-_arid,5052016.html; 
"Gravierender Verstoß gegen Corona-Auflagen – Mehr als 150 
Trauergäste auf Friedhof Birkenfeld’, Nahe-Zeitung 
(08.05.2020), https://www.rhein-zeitung.de/region/aus-den-
lokalredaktionen/nahe-zeitung_artikel,-gravierender-verstoss-
gegen-coronaauflagen-mehr-als-150-trauergaeste-auf-friedhof-
in-birkenfeld-_arid,2120149.html.  
303  "Kirchen rechnen mit Gottesdiensten ab Mai’, ZEIT Online 
(17.04.2020); "Ausnahmen vom Gottesdienst-Verbot müssen 
möglich sein’, Spiegel Online (29.04.2020).  
304 "Gravierender Verstoß gegen Corona-Auflagen – Mehr als 
150 Trauergäste auf Friedhof Birkenfeld’, Nahe-Zeitung 
(08.05.2020), https://www.rhein-zeitung.de/region/aus-den-
lokalredaktionen/nahe-zeitung_artikel,-gravierender-verstoss-
gegen-coronaauflagen-mehr-als-150-trauergaeste-auf-friedhof-
in-birkenfeld-_arid,2120149.html; "Ramelow räumt Verstoß 
gegen Corona-Verordnung bei Beerdigung ein’, 
Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland (13.05.2020) 
https://www.rnd.de/politik/beerdigung-und-corona-bodo-
ramelow-verstosst-gegen-eigene-verordnung-
TT4YXR53Y4RQ2AH2DV6CXAUBJY.html.  
305 "Bericht aus der Kabinettssitzung vom 16.04.2020’, 
Bayerische Staatsregierung (16.04.2020) 
https://www.bayern.de/bericht-aus-der-kabinettssitzung-vom-
16-april-2020/?seite=28408; "Bericht aus der Kabinettssitzung 
vom 5. Mai 2020’, Bayerische Staatsregierung (05.05.2020) 
https://www.bayern.de/bericht-aus-der-kabinettssitzung-vom-5-
mai-2020/?seite=28408. 
306 "Finanzminister Scholz prüft steuerfreie Zulagen; Extra-Geld 
für alle Corona-Helden!’, BILD (25.03.2020), pp.1-
2.’Fernsehansprache von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel’, 
tagesschau.de (18.03.2020) 
https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video-
676493.html. 
307 "Die wahren Helden!’ BILD (14.03.2020), p.1; "Applaus vom 
Balkon reicht nicht’, ZEIT Online (18.03.2020); "So viel verdienen 
die Corona-Helden des Alltags’, Spiegel Online (25.03.2020); 
"'Corona-Held' ist ein gefährliches Wort", Spiegel Online 
(30.05.2020). 
308 "Mehr Infektionen bei medizinischem Personal’, 
tagesschau.de (16.04.2020) 
https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr/corona-aerzte-
pflegekraefte-101.html. 
309 "Bereits 2.300 Ärzte und Pfleger haben sich in Deutschland 
laut Robert-Koch-Institute mit dem Coronavirus angesteckt – 
die Dunkelziffer dürfte deutlich höher liegen’, Business Insider 
(03.04.2020) 
https://www.businessinsider.de/wissenschaft/gesundheit/rki-
mindestens-2-300-aerzte-und-pfleger-in-deutschland-mit-
corona-infiziert/; "Tausende Ärzte und Pflegekräfte mit 
Coronavirus infiziert’, Süddeutsche Zeitung Online (02.04.2020) 
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/coronavirus-aerzte-
pfleger-ansteckung-1.4865774. 
310 "Corona: Über 10.000 infizierte Ärzte und Pfleger – 16 Tote’, 
Augsburger Allgemeine (06.05.2020) https://www.augsburger-
allgemeine.de/politik/Corona-Ueber-10-000-infizierte-Aerzte-
und-Pfleger-16-Tote-id57341761.html. 
311 "COVID-19: Fallzahlen in Deutschland und weltweit, 28 Juli 
2020’, Robert Koch Institute (28.07.2020) 
https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavir
us/Fallzahlen.html. 
312 "Jede Kerze symbolisiert ein ausgelöschtes Leben’, BILD 
(15.04.2020), p.6.  
313 "Sipplinger Ehrensalven auch in Gedenken an Corona-Opfer 
und gegen Rassismus’, Südkurier (11.06.2020) 
https://www.suedkurier.de/region/bodenseekreis/sipplingen/si
pplinger-ehrensalven-auch-in-gedenkenbr-an-corona-opfer-und-
gegen-rassismus;art372492,10535569. 
314 "Bundesliga hält Schweigeminute’, RTL.de (20.05.2020) 
https://www.rtl.de/cms/in-gedenken-an-corona-opfer-
bundesliga-haelt-schweigeminute-4545899.html; "Zweitliga-
Spieltag startet mit Schweigeminute’, Schwäbische 
(22.05.2020) 
https://www.schwaebische.de/sueden/bayern_artikel,-
zweitliga-spieltag-startet-mit-schweigeminute-
_arid,11226008.html; "Werder spielt gegen Gladbach wieder mit 
Trauerflor’, Deichstube.de (23.05.2020) 
https://www.deichstube.de/news/werder-bremen-trauerflor-
gladbach-coronavirus-opfer-schweigeminute-bundesliga-
13551320.html; "Gedenkminute für Corona-Opfer vor 
Pokalfinale in Berlin’, Berlin.de (04.07.2020) 
54          Confronting the COVID-19 Pandemic  
 
https://www.berlin.de/aktuelles/berlin/6225037-958092-
gedenkminute-fuer-coronaopfer-vor-pokalf.html. 
315 ‘An Incalculable Loss’, New York Times (27.05.2020) 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/05/24/us/us-
coronavirus-deaths-100000.html.  
316 "Was bleibt? Leere und Schmerz’, taz (05.03.2020), 
https://taz.de/Gedenkfeier-in-Hanau/!5669603/; "Auf der Suche 
nach dem Licht im Dunkel’, Deutschlandfunk (20.12.2019), 
https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/gedenken-am-
breitscheidplatz-auf-der-suche-nach-dem-
licht.1773.de.html?dram:article_id=466350.  
317 "Opfer sollen Gedenkstätte auf Friedhof bekommen’, ZEIT 
Online (04.03.2020), 
https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2020-
03/hanau-rassistischer-anschlag-gedenkstaette-friedhof-opfer; 
"Wie hat Berlin den Terror vom Breitscheidplatz verarbeitet?’, 
Der Tagesspiegel (19.12.2019), 
https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/die-wunden-nach-dem-
anschlag-wie-hat-berlin-den-terror-vom-breitscheidplatz-
verarbeitet/25349412.html.  
318 "Wie hat Berlin den Terror vom Breitscheidplatz 
verarbeitet?’, Der Tagesspiegel (19.12.2019), 
https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/die-wunden-nach-dem-
anschlag-wie-hat-berlin-den-terror-vom-breitscheidplatz-
verarbeitet/25349412.html.  
319 "Die Deutschen und das Virus’, Süddeutsche Zeitung Online 
(18.05.2020), 
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/coronavirus-corona-krise-
einschraenkungen-lockerungen-umfragen-1.4904085.  
320 "Corona-Helden! WIR HELFEN!’, BILD (20.03.2020), p.5; "Die 
Stunde der stillen Helfer’, BILD (21.03.2020), p.4; "Wer waren 
noch mal die Leistungsträger der Gesellschaft?’ ZEIT Online 
(27.03.2020).  
321 "Mit Grundgesetz gegen den Verstand’, taz (31.03.2020) 
https://taz.de/Corona-und-
Verschwoerungstheoretiker/!5675712/. 
322 ‘Braune Infektionskette’, taz (12.04.2020) 
https://taz.de/Corona-Verschwoererinnen-
demonstrieren/!5677960/. 
323 "‘Hygiene-Demo‘ in Berlin: Juden angeblich Schuld an 
Corona’, Das Erste (06.05.2020) 
https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/Hygiene-Demo-in-
Berlin-Juden-angeblich-Schuld-an-
Corona,antisemitismus228.html; "Wolfgang Schäuble warnt vor 
‚Verschwörungs-Spinnern‘", ZEIT Online (27.05.2020); "Weniger 
Wütende’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (02.06.2020), p.5; "Üben für den 
1. Mai’ Süddeutsche Zeitung (27.04.2020), p.6; "Sie wollen sich 
anstecken dürfen’, Zeit Online (09.05.2020) 
https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2020-
05/coronavirus-proteste-demonstrationen-infektionsschutz-
einschraenkungen; "Corona-Demonstrationen: Positionen und 
Protagonisten’, Deutschlandfunk ( 20.05.2020) 
https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/COVID-19-pandemie-corona-
demonstrationen-positionen-
und.2897.de.html?dram:article_id=476457. 
324 "jedes Leben und jeder Mensch zählt’; source: 
‘Fernsehansprache von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel’, tagesschau.de 
(18.03.2020) 
https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video-
676493.html. 
Confronting the COVID-19 Pandemic          55  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The COVID-19 virus does not respect borders. 
Governments confront the same virus as it moves 
around the world. Despite this, the research 
presented here shows that governments adopt 
different narrative approaches in how they present 
the pandemic as a crisis, how they represent and 
narrate the deaths that the virus continues to 
cause, and how they memorialise ongoing loss. 
Despite all countries in our study facing at least the 
prospect of significant loss of life, individual 
countries adopted different approaches to 
narrating the crisis. Crucially, the sheer scale of 
death was not, as some might expect, 
deterministic of the narrative approach, nor indeed 
of the commemorative or governance choices 
taken. 
 
This research therefore suggests that 
governments and elites are faced with distinct 
choices over the narrative frames they adopt in 
addressing the nature of the crisis; how they 
address death, loss, and grief as an individual and 
collective experience; and how they discuss or 
prepare for memorialisation. We argue that these 
choices hold important implications for social 
cohesion. 
 
Crisis Narrative 
The war framing was not consistent across cases. 
In the case of the UK and Italy, this framing served 
as a rallying cry, whilst in South Korea, war-framing 
served to communicate the tragedy of the 
pandemic. The exception was Germany, where 
war-rhetoric was largely absent in favour of the 
discourse of ‘challenge’ or ‘test’.  War framing 
could be understood as an effort to relate the 
pandemic to a crisis that is more familiar in the 
public imagination. However, the use of the war 
frame depends on the meaning of war in differing 
national contexts. This demonstrates that the 
politics of martial framings are not as 
straightforward as they may appear. More 
specifically, the differences between war and 
pandemics suggest that this framing is limited in 
both the short and long term. War-framing 
suggests a greater role for human agency, a 
discrete temporality, and a less contested 
designation of culpability. As the historical and 
contemporary case studies suggests, elites 
struggle to narrate a crisis that appears to violate 
the division between reasoned rational human 
action on the one hand, and the natural world on 
the other. Pandemics raise questions over how 
societies relate to occurrences in the natural world, 
the governance of which is tenuous.  
 
Countries also varied in how they chose to 
organize the communication of information to the 
public. Here we might distinguish between 
technocratic (i.e. relating to policy responses) and 
affective (i.e. relating to emotional expressions of 
sorrow, sympathy, and solidarity) forms of 
communication. In the case of Germany and (to 
some extent) South Korea, more technocratic data 
was outsourced to the Robert Koch Institute and 
the Korean Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention respectively. In the case of Germany, 
this division of labour was clearest, relieving 
politicians of the duty of communicating 
information on the pandemic as such – including 
death rates – and allowing them to concentrate on 
political responses, and more affective 
communication strategies. This is in contrast to 
the UK where government ministers frequently 
blurred the boundaries between the 
communication of pandemic data, public health 
messaging, and the political and/or affective 
response. At times this ambiguity seems to have 
clouded the government’s messaging strategy and 
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enabled accusations of the ‘politicization’ of the 
pandemic response. In extreme cases, the 
numerical representation of loss alongside 
affective responses potentially trivialized death, 
and allowed stale expressions of remorse to 
emerge as almost scripted. 
 
Death Management 
Countries also differed on how they chose to 
communicate death figures and, as a result, the 
relative emphasis placed on death per se, in the 
overall pandemic crisis narrative. South Korea’s 
Ministry of Health provided the most 
comprehensive figures, including tests and 
recovery rates. Germany’s emphasis on the ‘R-
value’ rate of infection appears to have laid greater 
emphasis on individual responsibility. In Italy and 
the UK death figures were reported daily during the 
height of the crisis, with Italy highlighting the 
tragedy of the fact of loss, and the UK framing 
deaths as indications of the overall trajectory (and 
eventual recovery) of the pandemic. As lockdowns 
ended and daily briefings were discontinued, death 
figures were de-emphasized (though the figures 
remained available, if one searched). Accordingly, 
the UK and Italy may be understood as setting de 
facto rates of ‘normal’ or ‘acceptable’ death. This 
normalisation of death, particularly in the UK, may 
be seen as silencing, or minimizing, the grief and 
loss experienced by many. 
 
It is important to note too that the scale of loss 
was not commensurate with the time spent by 
elites on communicating the significance of 
individual losses. Here we might speak of the 
individualization versus the collectivization of 
death. Perhaps facilitated by relatively low death 
rate, South Korean officials humanised individual 
instances of loss by providing greater detail on the 
deceased, offering a more micro-level discourse of 
blame and culpability, falling on both individual 
behaviours as well as management of the state 
health system. This played into a wider definition 
of success that implicitly aspired to a ‘zero deaths’ 
policy, rather than setting an implicit threshold of 
deaths that would be considered a ‘success’, or at 
least socially acceptable, as in the UK context. The 
South Korea example suggests that narrating and 
humanising individual deaths offers an alternative 
narrative of death that may provide a more 
relatable message on the importance of following 
public health guidance, as well as a didactic 
function in providing information or lessons learnt 
on how to respond to the virus. In Germany, 
despite also experiencing relatively low death 
rates, a macro-statistical collectivizing approach 
was in evidence. Though it was expressed in 
abstract terms that each death was a tragedy, 
actual deaths were not discussed individually in 
public discussions. Italy, in contrast to all three, 
framed mass deaths, particularly of the elderly, as 
extremely tragic, insisting both that each death 
was sad, but also directly engaging with the scale 
of death as itself a form of tragedy. 
 
Commemoration and Memorialisation 
Across all cases, memorialisation practices were 
uneven. Italy, thus far, is alone in having explicitly 
outlined state-backed memorialisation plans in 
addition to more local and regional initiatives – 
though a recent proposal for federal 
commemorative action in Germany has just been 
tabled. Elsewhere, ad-hoc, private, and community-
led initiatives lead the way. The relative dearth of 
state-led memorialisation perhaps reflects the fact 
that the pandemic is ongoing, but this should not 
obscure the ongoing practices – what might be 
termed ‘implicit’ memorialisation – through which 
elites singled out collective moments of grief 
amongst certain communities. These implicit 
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memorialisations served to mobilize wider 
collective efforts. In the case of the UK, singling 
out carers and health workers underscored the 
‘protect the NHS’ message. In Italy, stress on the 
differential generational impact identified the 
elderly as requiring particular protection. Germany 
is distinct in the relative absence, thus far, of local 
commemorative efforts – though public discourse 
reiterated the tragedy of the loss of vulnerable 
people as a failure of society.  
 
As the historical case study suggests, this 
hierarchalisation of grief carries with it the implicit 
silencing of loss amongst particular communities, 
often members of marginalised and minoritised 
groups. As a result, hierarchies of grief risk 
perpetuating existing patterns of inequality and 
exclusion, and creating new ones – particularly 
amongst groups most affected by the pandemic in 
terms of both health and/or economic impacts. 
The misrecognition of loss – as well as the total 
non-recognition of loss – is an important aspect of 
trauma. Failing to recognize loss may exacerbate 
collective and individual grief and trauma, 
particularly when, as each case demonstrates, 
funeral practices and ritualised grieving processes 
are disrupted. This is an example of how 
seemingly technocratic decisions to restrict 
funerals intersect with memorialisation and 
commemoration practices, with attendant social 
and political effects.   
 
The corollary of this is that the decision not to 
memorialise is a choice in itself with longer-term 
implications for social cohesion and preparedness 
for future crises. Here, the temporal dimensions of 
memorialisation are clearer. Commemoration 
serves to demarcate the start and end of mass 
death events, providing a site around which 
communities may grieve, seek catharsis, recollect, 
prepare, and place into context future mass death 
events. As the historical case study demonstrates, 
pandemics do not sit prominently in public 
memory, with implications for future preparation. 
The Avian flu pandemic of 1957 killed 14,000 in the 
UK alone, with the impact on industry dipping the 
country into recession. Commentators at the time 
remarked on the failure to heed the lessons of 
1918.325 Signalling an intention to commemorate 
may also offer a temporal horizon to the present 
pandemic, providing a future point in time at which 
society may begin the process of remembering. 
Commemoration may also be re-framed as an on-
going process, serving to recognise the many 
forms of uncertainty, grief, and loss produced by 
the pandemic. Not commemorating, or 
commemorating in a non-inclusive manner, also 
represent choices that will entail longer-term 
effects on social order.  
 
Contestation over the appropriate response to the 
pandemic has so far not obviously manifested in 
large-scale social order challenges. Indeed, the 
immediate crisis, as perhaps might be expected, 
prompted expressions of solidarity and belonging 
in most places. There is, however, evidence of 
fracture in that consensus. Concurrent expressions 
of dissent – whether the Black Lives Matter 
movement, Extinction Rebellion demonstrations, or 
the libertarian/populist counter-movements in 
Germany and Italy – also show that parallel 
(though certainly not equivalent, in terms of 
politics and ethical claims) movements may 
respond to perceived failings in pandemic 
governance. The pandemic response also, further, 
highlights existing inequalities and inequities, such 
as racism, classism, ableism, ageism, and health 
inequalities, that typified the pre-COVID ‘normal’ 
social order. The historical case study similarly 
highlights how the British public and newspaper 
commentators were less forgiving of the response 
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to the second wave of the influenza pandemic. It 
impacted with more deadly effect, prompting far 
closer scrutiny of the efficacy of the government’s 
response at a local and national level.  
 
This research then highlights the choices that 
elites (and publics) face in their response to further 
iterations of the pandemic. The policy implications 
of these with regard to government 
communication and commemoration are 
discussed in the appendices.  In brief, these 
choices may be framed by a series of questions: 
 
§ How central should death be in public 
communications and narratives of the 
pandemic? How can public communications 
address ostensibly more ‘positive’ subjects 
such as recovery and social/economic 
normalisation without trivialising or 
normalising death in pursuit of social and 
economic goals? 
 
§ What metaphors and analogies, if any, are 
most appropriate when narrating and framing 
future iterations of the COVID-19 pandemic? 
 
§ Which agency, or individual, should hold 
responsibility for communicating the data 
surrounding the progress of the pandemic? 
 
§ Which agency(ies), or individual(s), should 
hold responsibility for communicating grief 
and loss? 
 
§ What form should memorialisation and 
commemoration take, and at what scale? 
How can different communities be supported 
in practices of memorialisation and 
commemoration?  
 
§ How can the state and local authorities 
support communities and individuals in 
managing experiences of grief and disrupted 
mourning? 
 
COVID-19 itself, as a mass death event, presents a 
major challenge to social order – and will likely 
remake that order in ways that may not yet be 
visible or imaginable. The choices made today, 
technocratic, narrative, and commemorative, 
including those that are stop-gap or ad-hoc, will be 
part of this process of remaking. This is true for all 
aspects of the pandemic, but particularly so in 
relation to death, wherein the fact of change, 
absence, and loss is impossible to deny and is 
therefore socially and politically central. How each 
society chooses to narrate, manage, and 
commemorate death in the COVID-19 pandemic 
will thus play a key role in shaping the post-COVID-
19 world. 
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325 Claire Jackson, ‘History Lessons: The Asian Flu Pandemic,’ 
British Journal of General Practice 59, no. 565 (August 1, 2009): 
622–23, https://doi.org/10.3399/bjgp09X453882. 
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Appendix: Policy Briefs  
 
Communicating the Pandemic 
Bolstering Social Cohesion in the Context of a Second Wave 
 
• The COVID-19 pandemic presents specific challenges to government communication: the cause 
of the crisis is invisible, policy responses are multifaceted and based on specialist technical 
expertise, and the effects are diffuse and highly complex.  
• New LSE research comparing government communication and commemoration, and national 
media coverage of the pandemic across four countries (Germany, Italy, South Korea, and the UK) 
highlights differing national approaches in communicating the pandemic, and their potential 
societal impact. 
• In the UK, differing experiences of  pandemic vulnerability and loss risks undermining 
government messaging and damaging social cohesion. Government communication needs to 
engage with grief, explicitly recognising sadness and loss, to counteract this. 
• The crisis being framed in the UK using ‘war’ metaphors risks analogizing certain key worker 
professions as soldiers, and their deaths as inevitable or expected. It also suggests a clear end 
point to the crisis, which may not be helpful for managing longer term policy interventions.  
Recognising grief and loss in official communication 
• Government narratives about a crisis—messaging about what has occurred, who is responsible, 
and what are likely and/or acceptable costs— can play a critical role in galvanizing public support 
for policies. They can also have the unintended consequence of limiting future policy choices in 
longer-term interventions.  
• Our research suggests that government messaging that neglects the emotional experience of 
the pandemic, particularly grief and fear of loss, by everyday citizens may reduce public trust and 
exacerbate social tensions.   
• The South Korean government’s messaging of the pandemic includes explicit recognition of 
depression and loneliness one may feel due to longer-term policy interventions to control the 
pandemic. This accurately reflects the emotional experience of citizens, given continued social 
distancing and localised lockdowns.   
Differing experiences of grief and loss in the UK 
 
• Current UK patterns of death – marginalised communities are more at risk, and fatalities tend 
to be concentrated locally – produce an unequal distribution of grief and loss across different 
groups and cities/regions in the country. 
 
• At the same time, citizens’ media consumption – frequency, medium, and outlet – may 
produce different perceptions of the pandemic and fatality patterns. For example: The 
Guardian reported on BAME vulnerability to COVID-19 at approximately 10x the rate of The Sun 
or The Daily Mail. For care home deaths, this reduces to about 5x more often.  
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• Overly simplistic government messaging has the danger of obscuring such different 
experiences of grief, loss, and risk of COVID-19 within the UK. This may result in reduced 
support for public health measures during a second wave of COVID-19.  
 
• Government messages that exclude the experience of marginalised and minoritised 
communities may also perpetuate and intensify social divisions.   
 
Differing communication of deaths in the UK 
 
• In the UK, the prominence given to age and ‘underlying health conditions’ in reporting fatalities 
is understandable in terms of managing public anxiety, but suggests these deaths are inevitable 
and less sad than the deaths of younger and healthier people.  This perpetuates ageism, 
ableism, and health inequalities. 
• In contrast, our research found that in Italy, government narratives explicitly and frequently 
grieved the loss of elderly people who died as a result of the pandemic, and highlighted their 
vulnerability to COVID-19 as part of a narrative about the importance of social distancing as 
protection. 
• Framing deceased key workers as ‘heroes’ recognises public service, but also normalises death 
as a risk associated with health, caring, and other key occupations, and creates an implicit 
standard of visible and conventional public sacrifice as criteria for deserving grief – often 
excluding people outside work, such as elderly, disabled and homeless people.  
• This risks undermining the efficacy of public health messaging by normalising the deaths of 
elderly people, people with ‘underlying health conditions’, and key workers as acceptable or 
inevitable. If these deaths are framed as acceptable or inevitable, calls for future social 
distancing and other public health measures may be less compelling or effective. 
Recommendations 
 
• Instead of a war narrative, government should use a narrative frame that evokes manageable 
difficulty and captures the multifaceted effects of the pandemic - communicating the nature of 
the crisis, including what kind of suffering it entails, what the appropriate policy responses are, 
and what the desired outcomes are, and as a ‘challenge’ that explicitly evokes solidarity and 
community.  
• Communication around deaths of the elderly or those with underlying conditions should 
emphasise that they are not inevitable. All deaths should be addressed directly and without 
metaphors or euphemisms 
• Openly recognise the differential patterns of death and grief/loss in official communications 
(e.g. BAME communities, difficulties for religious groups to hold services). 
• Provide a clear separation between different types of communication: factual, political, and 
emotional. Explicitly, empathetically and consistently address the grief experienced by the 
public in emotive terms. This should be independent from the briefings on public health or 
economic policies, and led by a designated ‘mourner in chief’ – such as the Prime Minister – for 
consistency. 
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The Challenge and Necessity of Commemorating COVID-19 
 
• New LSE research compares government commemoration and communication, and national 
media coverage of COVID-19 in four countries (Germany, Italy, South Korea, and the UK) as well 
as a study of the UK response to the 1918-1919 Spanish Flu pandemic, to examine the key 
factors in successful pandemic commemoration. 
• The research finds that commemoration and collective memory are crucial, though often 
overlooked, components of pandemic management and recovery. Inaccurate collective 
memory impedes future policy making and creates and exacerbates social cleavages, 
undermining social cohesion and public trust in government.  
• Commemoration that excludes specific types of victims or does not adequately recognise the 
different types of suffering experienced by the public can result in social tensions and 
perceptions of marginalisation. Government should try to ensure commemoration and 
memorialisation reflects different UK experiences. 
• Key recommendations from the research are for a national day of mourning, a four-nations 
collective history project, and a commemoration and memorialisation support fund. 
• Currently, UK citizens’ experiences of COVID-19 grief, loss, and risk vary substantially, 
differentiated along geographic, occupational, class and ethnicity lines, and by differing media 
consumption. This risks the formation of a simplistic collective memory of the pandemic that 
excludes marginalised and minoritised communities and perpetuates social divisions. 
• At the moment, Government and media messaging about COVID-19 vulnerability inadvertently 
perpetuates ageism, ableism, and health inequalities. It also risks undermining the efficacy of 
public health messaging by normalising the deaths of elderly people and those with ‘underlying 
health conditions’ as acceptable or inevitable.  
• Past research on narratives of victimization and suffering following incidences of mass death 
indicate that exclusive or overly homogenized national narratives of the event can exacerbate 
social cleavages, by creating a sense of marginalisation of certain social groups and 
contributing to hostility between groups. This can result in greater propensity towards social 
unrest and conflict. 
• Conversely, inclusive national narratives that recognise a wide array of suffering and 
victimization can contribute to greater understanding between social groups and overall 
increase in societal openness and tolerance. 
 
The current commemoration situation 
• The scale of COVID-19 death and loss to families and communities in the UK has yet to be 
directly and officially acknowledged in its own right.  
• Ad hoc commemoration of COVID-19 is already taking place across UK. However national-level 
commemoration has emphasised the sacrifices of health and key workers, not COVID-19 
deaths overall (e.g. 28 April minute’s silence).  
• Individuated memorialisation, such as obituaries, recognise dignity and loss of each person, 
and humanize suffering beyond statistics, however the scale of death makes collecting and 
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communicating individuated remembrances challenging, though media 
organisations are making efforts to collect tributes. 
• St Paul’s Cathedral’s Book of Remembrance is (to date) the only place of national symbolic 
significance where the names of all deceased may be memorialised – there are no plans yet 
announced for official national commemoration of COVID-19 or memorialisation of victims.  
• The most prominent commemoration efforts were brief and/or attached to another event. The 
moment of silence for the dead on 4 July preceded the ‘main event’ celebration of the NHS’s 
birthday on 5 July. A ‘frontline hospital worker’ is being added to the already-proposed national 
emergency services ‘999’ memorial in London.  
• Local commemoration efforts help fill this void, but are less able to provide symbolic 
recognition of loss, and communicate the diversity of the overall UK experience of grief.  
 
• Reflective and inclusive commemorative practices that recognise different experiences of grief 
are crucial to maintaining social cohesion and reducing tensions between different social 
groups. This is particularly critical as the UK moves towards more localised forms of 
lockdowns.  
 
Recommendations  
 
• Government should designate a national day of mourning, for one year only, marked by a day 
off work and official programming at national and local levels by religious and government 
officials.  
• A four-nations collective history project should be commissioned to collect remembrances of 
the deceased and experiences of loss in communities. This should lead to locally-embedded 
online social histories to help communities remember local experiences and loved ones, while 
also mapping COVID-19 experiences.   
• A fund should be established to support commemoration and memorialisation to which 
local/regional/national groups and communities may apply to support projects and 
activities. A steering committee should consider proposals, with membership including 
religious authorities, unions, families and loved ones of the deceased, health and care workers, 
grief counsellors, funeral workers, artists and others.  
• Government should develop a set of best practices to be applied to commemorative 
practices, events, and monuments. This could include:  
- Processes for consultation with local communities and guidelines for ensuring project 
leaders and consultations are diverse, inclusive, and representative   
- Requirements for considering diversity, inclusivity, and accessibility in the commissioning 
and design of monuments, statues, and events  
• A clear differentiation should be drawn between commemoration (recognition of an important 
event/social contribution) and memorialisation (of deceased) in public recognition of health, 
care, and key workers.  
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